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ABSTRACT

This dissertation used critical race theory as a basis to probe legal and
regulatory transitions in the area of minority ownership and their implications for
marketplace diversity and public interest. Through the examination of judicial
decisions involving minority broadcast ownership this dissertation analyzed the
expressed or implied assumptions of the judiciary in reaching those decisions,
provided a critical analysis of those assumptions, discussed the implications and
results of those assumptions on minority broadcast ownership, and suggested
approaches to promote diversity and minority ownership in a deregulated media
environment.
Both primary and secondary authorities were integral to this research.
Overall, analysis took place in three parts. First, there was a collection of United
States district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court cases in the area of
minority ownership and minority ownership policies promoted by the FCC.
Second, analysis of cases consisted of reviewing majority and dissenting
opinions. Placing majority and dissenting opinions in the framework of critical
race theory, the study continued with determining the judicial rationales and
arguments.
The FCC expressed concern that historically, minority groups have been
underrepresented. While moderately helpful, minority broadcast ownership
policies (such as distress sales and tax certificates) were superseded by major
court decisions and the deregulatory movement towards the "economic"
marketplace of ideas. Not surprisingly, the period since the Telecommunications
vi

Act of 1996 has seen a decline in minority ownership and arguably in
marketplace diversity.
Deregulation has left the decisions of service and programming to the
economic forces operating within the broadcast industry. With the increasing
relaxation of government regulations, broadcasters have discretion in how they
serve the public's interests. From the early 1990s until the present, the FCC
minority preferences have been challenged and severely restricted. The trend
towards deregulating the broadcast industry has coincided with the increased
hostility toward and lack of support for minority ownership preferences.
Legally and socially, the concept of race was initially defined in terms of
group rights, as seen in TV 9 and Garrett decisions. With the remnants of
segregation embedded in society, race was seen as a label. However, as
economic and social changes took place, there was a backlash. Minority
ownership policies were perceived as forms of "reverse discrimination" against
the white majority. Discrimination against groups began to be attributed to
individual actions in isolated, specific contexts. The courts shifted in their
interpretation of FCC rationales for minority ownership policies and deferred to
administrative agencies (FCC) and congressional action, as they recognized
Congress' power to promote the interest of society.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
began to change its approach to minority ownership polices. In National Black
Media Coalition, the courts allowed the industry's focus on technological
advancements to prevail over citizen concerns. With the coming of new
vii

technologies such as personal communication services (PCS), high-definition
television (HDTV), and direct broadcast satellite (DBS), the FCC was looking to
advance pro-industry, deregulatory policies. Congress soon followed the FCC's
stance as comparative hearings were replaced with competitive bidding. The
courts, without questioning what impact these changes may have on minorities,
upheld the deregulation of the industry.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The marketplace of ideas language coined by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., in World War I sedition cases continued to cast a shadow over
thought and language into the latter years of the 20th century and beyond. The
marketplace of ideas is a commonly held expression, which has been found in
policy statements by the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] as a
manifestation of a desire to promote diversity in broadcast ownership and
programming. The FCC expressed concern that historically, minority groups have
been underrepresented. Recognizing this as an issue, the FCC instituted a series
of minority preferences in the 1960s/1970s. While moderately helpful, these
policies were superseded by major court decisions and the deregulatory
movement towards the "economic" marketplace of ideas, a belief that unbridled
competition would mean good results for society. Not surprisingly, the period
since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has seen a decline in minority
ownership and arguably in marketplace diversity.
While some argue that the marketplace of ideas and the economic
marketplace are one and the same, 1 the ability of these concepts to work
together is questionable. 2

Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. R. 207
(1982) Fowler and Brenner assert that the free market (removed of regulation) would allow the rights of the
viewers to be heard and attended to.
2 Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority Advocacy before the FCC: Using Marketplace Rhetoric to Urge
Policy Change, 41 FED. COM. L.J. 133, (1989) [Hereinafter Minority Advocacy). The author stated that
deregulation has limited the citizens ability to be heard noting the removal of the fairness doctrine,
ascertainment requirements, and the limited appeals through public participation (license challenges, etc.);
See also Wilfrid Rumble, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide Diverse Viewpoints on Issues
of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to Receive Critical Information, 28 SAN FRANCISCO
1

1

Former FCC chairman Newton Minow declared, "I reject this ideological
view that the marketplace will regulate itself and that the television marketplace
will give us perfection." 3 Deregulation has left the decisions of service and
programming to the economic forces operating within the broadcast industry. 4
With the increasing relaxation of government regulations, broadcasters have
discretion in how they serve the public's interests. 5
Quoting former governor of Florida and past president of the National
Association of Broadcasters, LeRoy Collins, Minow said public interest in
broadcasting,
" ... must have a soul and a conscience, a burning desire to
excel, as well as to sell; the urge to build the character,
citizenship and intellectual stature of people ... "6

However, there remains great ambiguity about what exactly constitutes
"public interest." Rather than trying to clarify the concept, broadcaster- friendly
regulators resolved to let industry forces and economic bottom-line
considerations define what the public interest should be. It is arguable that by
removing FCC and government restrictions, broadcasters will be inclined to
pursue those ideas. But as Don R. LeDuc has argued, broadcasters often
sacrifice freedom of expression in order to secure economic concessions or

LAw REVIEW793 (1994); Vincent Mosco, The Mythology of Telecommunications Deregulation, 40 JOURNAL
OFCOMMUNICATIONS
36 (1990).
3 Newton Minow, How Vast The Wasteland Now? Thirtieth Anniversary of "The Vast Wasteland" 12
!Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991).
Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpreting
the Public Interest Standard, 60 NORTH
CAROLINA
LAw REVIEW1057 at 1104 (1982).
5 Jon T. Powell and Wally Gair, Public Interest and the Business
of Broadcasting 39 (1988).
6 Supra note 3 at 23.

2

advantages. 7 For example, many stations opt to forego investing monies into
news and public affairs programming, which are traditionally considered the heart
of public interest obligations. 8
Previous judicial and government involvement promoted minority
preferences and viewpoints in the media. From the mid-1960s until 1989, the
FCC and Congress have enacted various policies to help minorities gain a
foothold in the industry. 9 While these policies have helped minorities make small
strides in ownership, they failed to substantially increase the number of minority
owners and have not been without their critics. From the early 1990s until the
present, the FCC minority preferences have been challenged and severely
restricted. 10 The trend towards deregulating the broadcast industry has coincided
with the increased hostility toward and lack of support for minority ownership
preferences.

7

Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. & Don R. LeDuc, Law of Mass Communications 453 (8th ed. 1995).
See, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, FCC Mimeograph No. 81575, March 1946.
The 'Blue Book' is a 1946 document that outlined the public service responsibilities of broadcast licensees.
Though never officially enforced by the FCC, the Blue Book provided a thorough and well-reasoned
guideline. In order for broadcasters to fully serve the public's interest, four major issues were deemed
important: 1) elimination of excessive advertising, 2) carriage of programs devoted to public service, such as
news, 3) coverage of live, local programming, and 4) carriage of sustaining programming, which meant
programs that were paid for by the station as opposed to sponsorships. See also, Michael McKean and
Vernon Stone, Deregulation and Competition: Explaining the Absence of Local Broadcast News Operation,
69 JOURNALISM
QUARTERLY
713 (1992); Benjamin Bates and L. Todd Chambers, The Economic Value of
Radio News: Testing Assumptions of Deregulation, Paper presented at 43 rd Annual ICA conference,
Washington, D.C. May 1993.
9 Distress sale, minority tax certificates and incubator programs. See, In Office of Communications v. FCC,
123 U.S. APP. D.C. 328 (1966) (citizens had standing to dispute a station's programming in regards to
minorities). Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 873 F.2d 347
(1989). Rehearing En Banc denied June 21, 1989) (minority enhancements in license hearings were
upheld); Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (held the FCC's
~olicies of minority preferences in license hearings and the distress sale were constitutionally valid).
0 Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the FCC's extension of minority enhancements to women
was unconstitutional.) In 1995, Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (the FCC's sex-preference
policy violated the Fifth Amendment.) In 1995, the minority tax certificate program was abolished.

8

3

PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this study was to explore the concept of race in minority
ownership policies through the analysis of court decisions. This dissertation uses
critical race theory as a basis to probe legal and regulatory transitions in the area
of minority ownership and their implications for marketplace diversity and public
interest. Through the examination of judicial decisions involving minority
broadcast ownership this dissertation: 1) analyzed the expressed or implied
assumptions of the judiciary in reaching those decisions, 2) provided a critical
analysis of those assumptions, 3) discussed the implications and results of those
assumptions on minority broadcast ownership, and 4) suggested approaches to
promote diversity and minority ownership in a deregulated media environment.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Critical legal studies are characterized by a central message that laws
exist to legitimate the current maldistribution of wealth and power. 11 Initially,
critical legal studies attracted minority legal scholars because of its fundamental
belief that change is needed to create a just society. 12 Critical legal studies (CLS)
challenged dominant legal discourse but did not acknowledge the minority voice,
which led many to believe CLS' analysis of the law was incomplete. 13

11

Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations in Critical Race Theory: Key
Writings that Formed The Movement 64 (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall
Thomas, eds., 1995).
12 Id. At 64-65.
13 Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law in Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that Formed The Movement 107-108 (Kimberle
Creshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds., 1995) [Hereinafter Race and reform].

4

Inspired by the failures of CLS to include the minority voice, critical race
theory emerged in 1980 with its first official conference held in 1989. 14 Critical
race theorists seek to identify values and norms that are hidden in the law
through the combination of various philosophies (e.g., Marxism and Black
Nationalism), disciplines (e.g. sociology, feminist studies) and techniques (e.g.
narratives).
Critical race theory is eclectic, as it draws from various sources of
doctrines, methods, and styles. 15 However there are some basic tenets most
critical race theorists hold to be true. 16 First, racism is normal in our society and is
in fact part of our history and laws. Second, because race is so firmly entrenched
in our society it is difficult to believe that our legal system is "color blind." Third,
laws ought to be understood and interpreted with an eye on the history and
context in which they were initially created. Fourth, the experiences of people of
color make them effective in analyzing the law, especially the areas on nondiscrimination.

17

Critical race theory contends that since there is no singular voice within
the law, cultural and racial uniqueness should be reflected. 18 There is no clear,
dominant interpretation of the law because such thinking leaves out marginalized

14

Richard Delgado, Introduction in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)
\Hereinafter Introduction].
5 John 0. Galmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual
Life in a Multicultural World in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed The Movement 315-328
~Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
6 Introduction, supra note 14 at xiv- xv.
17 Id.
18 Robert J. Arajuo, Race Relations and Conflict in the United States: Critical Race Theory: Contributions to
and Problems for Race Relations, 32 GoNz. L. REV.537 (1996/1997).

5

perspectives. Race is not a fixed term; it is fluid and complex. 19 Race neutrality,
within the legal system, creates an illusion that race (and racism) is no longer a
major contributor to the condition of the black underclass. 20
Mainstream legal discourse is generally without perspective because it is
exclusive of conflicting views, values and experiences. 21 This exclusion hinders
the progress of minority groups since majority opinions are viewed as
impediments to racial equality. 22 Opponents feel critical race theorists overanalyze the differences between races and dismiss the similarities. 23 Yet critical
race theorists conclude that to truly achieve equality, whites, people of color,
courts, etc. need to acknowledge that our society and our laws are race
conscious. 24
Additionally, critical race theorists advocate pluralism and promote
multiculturalism over a unified knowledge and cultural tradition. By advancing
pluralism, critical race theory discards a singular, assumption-driven meaning of
law.25 Critical race theorists support the removal of the "color-blindness" ideology
that permeates current policy, and decision-making processes that govern
American law.26 They contend that affirmative action, as a social policy tool and a

19

Galmore, supra note 15 at 318.
Race and reform, supra note 13 at 112.
21 Galmore, supra note 15 at 325.
22 Carlos Nan, Adding Salt to the Wound: Affirmative Action and CRT, 12 LAw& INEQ.J. 553 (1994).
23 See generally, Race and reform, supra note 13.
24 Id. See also, Galmore. supra note 15.
25 See, Robert L. Hayman, Race and Reason: The Assault on Critical Race Theory and the Troth About
Inequality, 16 NAT'LBLACKL. J. 1 (1998/1999); Nancy Levit, Critical Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and
Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795 (1999).
26 Id.
20

6

matter of law, is slow to bring about progress and is relatively ineffective. 27
Critical race theorists argue that advances made through affirmative action have
been cyclical, with small steps forward and disproportionately large leaps
backwards.
This cyclical movement may be what legal scholar Derrick Bell refers to as
the "interest-convergence" theory. 28 Bell's theory advances the idea that when
the interest of blacks (and presumably other minorities as well) in achieving racial
equity "converges" with the interest and comfort level of the white majority, is
when progress is made. If there is no convergence, racial equity becomes
stagnant or possibly reversed. 29
For example, while the initial goals and beliefs behind affirmative action
programs had some effects, by the late 1970s, those who were privileged (i.e.,
white majority) began to see a tightening job market. 30 As employment
opportunities began to dwindle, resentment grew toward polices that seemed to
provide an "unfair advantage" to others. 31 The white majority insisted that
affirmative action achieved its goals and was no longer needed to correct any
injustices. Affirmative-action policies were attacked as a form of "reverse
discrimination".

32

27

Nan, supra note 22.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. R.
518 (1980).
29 Id.
30 Nan, supra note 22 at 556.
31 Id. at 556.
32 Id.

28

7

The resentment towards affirmative action policies continues. A 1990
California poll taken by the San Francisco Chronicle and KRON-TV revealed fiftyfive percent of white males were in support of ending affirmative action, while
thirty-one percent of women were in favor of keeping the policy. 33 In addition,
sixty-one percent of white males stated affirmative action had gone too far.
Similar sentiments were expressed in a report from the Commission on AfricanAmerican Affairs, located in the state of Washington. 34 The report examined
affirmative action policies that governed hiring within state government. Findings
of the report include statistics on the percentage and number of hires under
affirmative action policies. In 1994, sixty-two minority women, thirty-seven white
women, and thirty-five veterans were noted as new employees that would not
have been interviewed for their jobs had it not been for affirmative action. 35 That
year, the state of Washington hired over three thousand new workers.
Similarly in 1993, one hundred and sixty-seven whites and one hundred
and fifty-three minorities were hired as a direct result of affirmative action
programs. That year, the state hired close to thirty-five hundred new workers. 36 A
study conducted in 2000 by the University of Michigan found racial prejudice as
the main factor as to why whites continue to oppose affirmative action. 37 The
study, which interviewed over one thousand adults in the Detroit area, concluded

33

Yumi Wilson, Perceptions: Minority Women's Views Opposite of White Men's, THESANFRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
June 10, 1995 at AB.
34 Kerry Murakami, Affirmative Action Helps Whites Too, Says Report-Policy
Doesn't Affect Most State
Workers, THESEATTLE
TIMES,July 27, 1995 at 81.
3s
36
37

Id.
Id.

Jeannie Baumann, U. Michigan Study: Prejudice Fuels Opinion, U-Wire, February 16, 2000.

8

whites that opposed affirmative action also showed little empathy or high regard
for blacks. In addition, whites that identified with racist statements (such as
blacks have gotten more than they deserve) were also more likely to oppose
affirmative action. 38
Despite some evidence that might dispel the myth of reverse
discrimination and the efforts of critical race theorists to include minority
viewpoints in matters of social and legal discussion, critics of critical race theory
call it oppositional scholarship because it challenges whiteness, white
dominance, and white experiences. 39 Other critics say the use of narratives
breed "subjectivity" and encourage irrational decisions. 4

° For some, narratives

have no place in law, especially in constitutional issues. 41 They contend that
case law does not turn on personal stories of tragedy because those are private
issues, whereas the law is a public issue.42
The notion of race-neutral laws creates what Crenshaw called "an illusion
that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the position of the
black underclass." 43 Race-neutral laws and 'color-blind' interpretations justify a
social, economic, and political system of law that is advantageous to whites. 44
Gotanda noted how current Supreme Court decisions have formalized race by

Id.
Galmore,supranote 15 at 318.
40 Hayman, supra note 25; Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 503 (1997).
41 Litowitz, supra note 40.
42 Id.
43 Race and reform, supra, note 13 at 117.
44 Neil Gotanda, A Critique Of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind' in Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that
Formed The Movement 261-262 (Kimberle Creshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds.,
1995) [Hereinafter Colorblind).
38

39

9

constructing categories of identity. 45 Race becomes an individual attribute (as
opposed to a group attribute) and is unrelated to any cultural or societal context.
Race becomes unconnected to present or past realities of oppression. 46
Consequently, racial discrimination is seen as an isolated phenomenon. This
impedes the nation's ability to address correlations between minority groups and
racism because race-neutral laws view social problems as independent. 47
What makes the survival of race-based programs such as affirmative
action more difficult is the judiciary's use of the standard of strict scrutiny. 48 On
matters related to constitutional law, strict scrutiny is applied to suspect
classifications, such as race, in the analysis of equal protection and to
fundamental rights such as due process. 49 Creation of statutes or polices based
on suspect classifications must establish a compelling interest that justifies the
need for law. This standard of review makes it more difficult to defend the
creation of minority ownership policies, especially in a deregulated marketplace.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This raises a fundamental research question: How has the legal and social
concept of race factored into minority broadcast ownership policies and
decisions?

In order to fully address this question, it is useful to subdivide it into

the following specific research questions:

45

46
47
48
49

Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 266-267.
BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY (BryanA. Garner,ed., 1996).
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1) In what ways have the courts viewed the issue of race and diversity in
broadcast ownership?
2) Is there a difference in the rationales used among the various courts
(e.g., Supreme Court versus Courts of Appeal) in deciding minority ownership
cases?
As questions continue to arise about the role and value of marketplace
diversity and the validity of the deregulatory movement, this study can advance
future debate on minority ownership issues.

OUTLINE OF STUDY
Chapter I, "Introduction," provides a general introduction to the research
topic. In addition, this chapter outlines the foundation for the entire dissertation.
The major problems-- minority broadcast ownership, race, and deregulation-- are
presented.
Chapter I explains how these problems are closely related to the
marketplace of ideas concept and how judicial interpretations have come to
shape the current status of minority ownership. The purpose of this research,
along with the research questions is presented.
Chapter II, "Literature Review," lays a historical and theoretical foundation
for the study. It begins by discussing the assumptions underlying the marketplace
of ideas philosophy. The chapter then traces communication and legal
scholarship in the areas of minority ownership, employment, and racial
preferences. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is discussed, as well as its

11

effects on media consolidation and minority ownership. In-depth review of
communications scholarship focuses on stereotypes, media portrayals,
programming, and ownership issues. The theoretical framework is explained in
detail.
Chapter 111,
"Methods," delineates the research design and methodology.
Delimitations of the dissertation also are clarified.
Chapter IV," Legislative Histories," summarizes congressional and
administrative agency discussions on minority ownership and broadcast race
preference policies. Particular attention is given to the broadcast comparative
hearing policy and minority tax certificate policy.
Chapter V, "Federal Court Cases," discusses minority ownership cases
from the district courts, court of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Chapter VI, "Analysis and Assumptions," provides a full investigation of
the judicial assumptions in each decision. More importantly, placed within the
framework of critical race theory, the analysis seeks to answer the major
research question: how have the legal and social concepts of race factored into
minority ownership policies? The other research questions are answered
through this chapter's exploration of judicial decisions.
Chapter VII, "Conclusion," summarizes the results. In addition, there are
suggestions for the future development of minority ownership policies and ideas
for future research.

12

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Freedom of speech, and presumably the freedom to receive speech, is the
backbone of modern mass mediated communications. The concept of freedom of
speech initially grew out of classical liberalism and libertarian principles. As it was
argued in the Four Theories of the Press, libertarian principles have helped to
shape the social and political structures that currently exist within mass media. 50
Under liberalism, the function of society is to advance the interest of
individual members. The state (government) exists as a means of providing
people with various ways to realize their own potential as members of society.
Individuals are considered seekers of truth. In order to gain knowledge and truth,
people must be able to communicate in an open market. 51 That means all people
must be allowed to speak. Within this concept of liberalism, the mass media
function to inform, entertain and assist society with the discovery of truth. This
discovery of truth comes through the media's ability to present all viewpoints.
Liberalism developed during the Enlightenment Period of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. 52 The eighteenth century saw the "transfer of the press
from authoritarian to libertarian principles." 53 Libertarian principles flourished
through the writings of philosophers such as John Milton, John Locke, and John

°

5

Fred S. Siebert, et. al, Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility,
and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do 39 ( 1963). Applied mainly to print
media, the "marketplace of ideas" has been stretched over the years to include broadcast media. Any
communications system that is free of control is said to promote the exchange of information in a democratic
society. It would follow that broadcasting is to adhere to the spirit of the marketplace of ideas; it should
expose people to a variety of messages.

Id.
Id. at 43.
53 Id. at 44.
51

52

13

Stuart Mill. Born in 1608, John Milton wrote Areopagitica,

54

in1644. Areopagitica

was Milton' s argument against the licensing of books, viewing such action as a
form of censorship. Claiming that mankind was inherently good at heart, Milton
believed liberty, freedom, and open debate permitted society to know truth.
Milton also believed that in order for truth to be known and discovered man would
have to ultimately encounter untruths. The often-quoted sentence, "Let her
falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to worse in a free and open
encounter?" is a testament to Milton's support of free speech. 55 His "self-righting"
principle stated that when truth and falsehood collided, truth would always
emerge. Since truth (as a concept) is very strong, it will prevail with or without
government involvement.
John Locke, born in 1632, is known as the father of empiricism, which is
the heart of scientific method. Locke stated knowledge was gained from the
inside and was the result of individual efforts. And while Locke stated everyone
has a property interest in his or her own person, 56 when society sought to
establish government individuals divested themselves of their right to their own
personage. The right of property no longer lay with individuals, but with the
government.

54

55
56

Sir R.C. Jebb, Milton-Areopagitica (1969).
Id. at 58.
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government: New Interpretations 182-183 (Edward J. Harpham, ed. 1992).
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Born in 1806, John Stuart Mill is often called the founding father of
liberalism. 57 His essay, On Liberty, 58 drew a sharp focus to the threat of individual
freedom by society.

59

Mill thought that humankind should be free to follow any

pleasures that brought happiness, but such pursuits should not interfere with the
freedom of others. While Mill said the greatest threat to freedom was society and
public opinion, he declared that all views ought to be presented for free
expression to work properly. Suppression of any kind worked against mankind. 60
In fact, Mill asserted that silencing of expression robbed the human race.61
Diversity of opinions, according to Milton, was advantageous and would always
be so until mankind entered a stage of "intellectual advancement." 62
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in a dissenting opinion in Abrams vs.
U.S.,63 borrowed from the writings of Milton and Mill to articulate his vision of free
speech and the First Amendment. The marketplace of ideas, according to
Holmes, should be free of government regulation. However, there were times
when Justice Holmes advocated government restraint of speech. In Schenk v.
US, 64 Justice Holmes wrote free speech and press were protected so long as

what was said did not constitute a "clear and present danger. "65

57

J. Herbert Altschull, From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism 161-162 (1990).
John S. Mill, On Liberty (1869).
59 Altschull, supra note 57 at 168.
60 Id.
61 The Classics: John Stuart Mill's On Liberty 20-21 (John Gary, ed. 1991).
62 Id. at 51.
63 Abrams vs. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
64 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
65 Altschull, supra note 57 at 121.
58

15

However Fred Siebert, a former dean of Communications at Michigan
State University, observed that Alexander Meiklejohn was critical of Holmes'
viewpoint. 66 Meiklejohn, a twentieth-century philosopher and educator, was
particularly suspicious of Holmes' clear and present danger test because the test
was inconsistent with libertarian principles. 67 Discussion by the public, in
Meiklejohn's view, should be free from government intervention at all times, just
as discussion by members of the legislature are free from government
intervention. 68
While Locke certainly held true to his assertion that man was able to selfgovern and control his property (meaning control his or her self without
interference), he did note that when governments were created people traded
those rights away. Milton and Mill both argued against state intrusion on social
debates (although liberalism does acknowledge that government involvement
exists from time to time). Holmes also declared that a functioning marketplace
allowed diverse ideas to compete with each other, with the best ideas winning
out. This "marketplace theory" has been a motivation for deregulating the
communications industry.69

MARKETPLACE DIVERSITY ASSUMPTIONS
The marketplace of ideas theory is based on assumptions about society,
some of which can be described as incomplete or faulty. Marketplace of ideas

66

Siebert, supra note 50 at 59.
Id.
6B Id.
69 Robert B. Horowitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform 260 (1989).
67
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theory and its liberal philosophical tenets consider people to be rational in
thought and continual seekers of truth. However, it cannot be expected that
reason will be exclusively used to comprehend reality. People create and
discover reality; thus, it is always changing. Many things can influence an
individual's perceptions of reality, from drugs to religious values. People are not
always rational, often using emotion or illogical information to make decisions.
Advertising is one example of how emotional and illogical appeals to human
senses can help guide people towards a perceived understanding or truth. In
other instances, people believe they are receiving the truth in its entirety and are
less inclined to seek additional sources of information. 70
It is also assumed the marketplace allows everyone a chance to be heard.
However, in reality not everyone has access. Average citizens do not own a
broadcast outlet. Becoming a broadcast owner takes a huge investment of time
and capital. As a result, not every individual will have the opportunity to become
a radio or television owner. However, individual citizens have tried to access the
media marketplace in other ways. Advocacy groups, interest groups and
community groups have tried to access broadcast stations on issues including
politics, religion, and minority representation. For example, in the late 1960s,

70

John Wright 111,Deregulation and Public Perceptions of TV: Longtudinal Study, 41 COMMUNICATION
266 (1990). Focused on public perception of news and programming before and after deregulation.
Surveys conducted over 4 year period showed people believed news and quality were sufficient and did not
feel as though they were less informed since deregulation.
STUDIES,
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citizen groups began to enter into agreements with stations about employment
and programming issues. 71
These agreements between citizen groups and broadcast stations
continued well into the 1970s, but started to decline by the 1980s. Krasnow
offered several reasons for the decline in agreements, such as fewer petitions,
denial of petitions that were presented, better negotiation between citizens and
broadcasters, and reduced financial support from the private sector, which left
those groups with fewer resources to challenge stations. 72
Access to media ownership is occasionally granted through appeals to the
station owners or the FCC. However, the ability for citizens to appeal has been
curtailed by recent rulings.73 There are fewer chances for renewal hearings as
the Telecommunications Act of 199674 eliminated the comparative process for
license renewals and replaced it with a new two-step renewal procedure. This
new process calls for automatic license renewal unless the license holder fails to
meet any of the following requirements: 1) service in the public interest,
convenience, and necessity, 2) no serious violations by the licensee of this Act or
Commission rules and regulations, and 3) no violations that would suggest an
ongoing pattern of abuse.

71

Erwin G. Krasnow, et. al, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation 56 (1982). Authors noted examples in
Texas and Los Angeles where citizen groups withdrew petitions to deny station license in return for
apreements that changed employment policies or programming.
7 Id. at 56- 57.
73 Minority Advocacy, supra note 2. See also lthiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 130- 131 (1983).
74 47 U.S.C. § 307 (c).
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THE NEED FOR MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP
For minority groups, portrayals are very important in how they view
themselves and their place in society. 75 TV news media often illustrate minority
groups, black Americans in particular, as poor and on welfare. The media images
associated with black Americans tend to reinforce such beliefs. 76 Whites, whom
often lack close contact and exposure to minority groups, depend on media and
cultural images for understanding such groups. 77
Media develop stereotypes as a shorthand method to communicate with
society about a variety of issues. While some stereotypes may be positive, in
many instances they are negative. Research indicates stereotypical images in
the media reinforce racist attitudes. 78 Stereotyping associates certain values,
characteristics, or expected behaviors with particular communities. As Kennedy
stated, the media and the images they present about race are often the source
from which others learn about people of color. 79

75

See, C Taylor, J.Y. Lee, 8.8. Stern, 1995. Portrayals of African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans in
Magazine Advertising, 38 AMERICAN
BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE
608 (1995); Jannette Dates & Edward Pease,
Warping The World: Media's Mangled Image of Race, 8 MEDIASTUDIES
JOURNAL
88 (1995); Paula Matabane
& Bishette Merritt, African Americans on Television: Twenty-five Years after Kerner, 7 HOWARD
JOURNAL
OF
COMMUNICATION
329 (1996); Gloria Abnernathy-Lear, African-Americans' Criticisms Concerning African
American Representation on Daytime Serials, 71 JOURNALISM
OuARTERLY
830 (1994).
76 Robert M. Entman & Andrew Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America 8-9
(2000).
' 1 Id. at 43.
78 Neil Vidmar & Milton Rokeach, Archie Bunker's Bigotry: A Study in Selective Perception and Exposure,
JOURNAL
OFCOMMUNICATION
36 (1974). The authors studied the effects of "All in The Family," a 1971 TV
comedy. The high prejudice viewers admired Archie over Mike, feeling that at the end of each episode
Archie won. Since there was no relationship between frequency of television watched and degree of
prejudice, the authors concluded that high prejudice persons watched "All in The Family" more than low
~rejudiced persons.
9 Deseriee Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of Advertising on Race," 32 ARIZSr.
L.J. 622 (1999).
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Some communications scholars contend that broadcasters, in order to
enhance profits, are willing to relinquish their duty in promoting free speech and
public interest. 80 Since deregulation, none of the industry's actions reveals a
commitment to providing or upholding public interest or free speech values. 81
And since free speech and diversity of voices were never explicitly a main policy
goal, they may never truly materialize within the deregulated environment.
In the current deregulated environment, the marketplace of ideas has
been redefined in terms of economic incentives. 82 Reliance on economic
incentives to bring about marketplace diversity favors those who already have
access, which is based on one's ability to compete on an economic, business
level. Minority groups are struggling to gain media ownership opportunities within
the increasingly economically oriented industry. 83

EARLY MINORITY INVOLVEMENT IN BROADCASTING
Minority ownership of broadcast properties is a relatively uncommon
phenomenon. However, minority involvement in the broadcast industry can be
traced back to early 1920s. Throughout that period and until World War II, jazz
music and its culture was idolized on radio. Barlow traced the history of black
contributions to the broadcast industry and stated that while blacks and their

80

Teeter, supra note 7.

Id.
Rumble, supra note 2; Kathryn Schmeltzer, Clearing The Air: Deregulation of the Broadcast Industry, 29
FB NEWS& JOURNAL398 (1982) [hereinafter Schmeltzer).
83 Kofi A. Ofori, When Being No. 1 Is Not Enough: The Impact of Advertising Practices On Minority-Owned &
Minority-Formatted Broadcast Stations (January 13, 1999)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/lnformal/ad-study/#tableofcontents>
[hereinafter Civil Rights
Forum).

81

82
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music were desired and imitated-- they were not allowed to perform on radio or at
public venues. 84 This exclusion transferred over into radio programming with
shows such as "Amos n' Andy." Public outcry against the show's stereotypical
portrayals of blacks mounted in 1931. Despite 740,000 signatures on a
nationwide petition and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People [NAACP] criticism, the Federal Radio Commission (the early predecessor
to the FCC) could not cancel the show.85 Although a call to end the show
garnered support within the black community, 86 the Federal Radio Act forbid the
FRC from interfering with communications or signals transmitted over broadcast
airwaves. 87
Blatant discrimination against black actors and actresses in radio
continued well into the 1940s. Even with a few black-hosted radio programs,
most of the programming failed. Many of the shows were created by whites for
the general white audience and usually were stereotypical. 88 Ownership of Negro
radio was usually by whites. The percentage of ownership by blacks was small
because many prospective minority owners could not find the money to finance a
purchase of a station or find experienced broadcasters to work at the stations.
Furthermore, major companies (mostly white-owned) would not advertise on
minority-owned or formatted stations for fear of alienating their white

84

William Barlow, Voice Over: The Making of Black Radio 13-35 (1999).
es Id.
86 While support for ending the show grew largely from the middle-class blacks, not all blacks endorsed the
removal of the show. See generally, Melvin Patrick Ely, The Adventures of Amos 'n' Andy: A Social History
of an American Phenomenon (1991); Thomas Cripps, Amos 'n' Andy and the Debate over American Racial
Integration in American History, American Television (1983).
87 § 47 u.s.c. 326.
88 Barlow, supra note 84 at 26-28 (1999).
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customers. 89 For many white advertisers believed equating their product and/or
image with minority groups, particularly blacks would have negative economic
consequences.

90

In addition, some southern communities pressured radio networks not to
carry black-hosted programs, as they felt uncomfortable with the idea of a
"Negro" on the air. 91 Stole examined the attempts of network television to
address the problem of representation, specifically looking at the actions of
National Broadcasting Company [NBC] and the Nat King Cole Show. NBC
sought to 'stay in touch' with the minority community and hosted several round
table discussions on ways to improve the status of minorities. They were careful
never to push integration, so as not to alienate sponsors. According to Stole,
NBC had gone through great lengths at the time to cultivate a "good public
relations campaign" with the black community. Afraid to lose its competitive edge,
NBC swept Nat King Cole away from Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] and
gave him his own show.
However, NBC did very little to ensure the success of the "Nat King Cole
Show." Low production budgets, sparse pay for the workers, and no advertising
contributed to the show's ultimate failure. Sponsorships for the show were low,

89

Id. at 183.

90

Kennedy, supra note 81 at 648.
Id. See also Richard S. Kahlenberg, Negro Radio, 26 THEE
NEGRO
HISTORY
BULLETIN
127 (1966) [hereinafter

91

Negro Radio]. The author indicated that mixed management was common, such as Negro stations being
white owned and black operated or white owned and white operated with mixed announcing staffs; Niger L.
RFEVIFEW
Stole, Nat King Cole and the Politics of Race and Broadcasting in the 1950's, 1 THECOMMUN/CATION
349 (1996). Stole examined minority TV employment in the 1950's and highlighted the attempts of network
television to address the problem of racial representation, specifically looking at the actions of National
Broadcasting Company [NBC] and the Nat King Cole Show.
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even after NBC drastically reduced its advertising rates. Co-ops were obtained,
but only in the Northern states. 92 The fear of the Southern audience withdrawing
from a particular sponsor was enough to keep many from advertising on the
show. Minority involvement in the broadcast industry was obviously limited during
this time. Blacks either played very small, stereotypical roles or they were simply
excluded from the industry altogether.
Even though minorities had purchased broadcast radio properties as early
as 1949, black broadcast ownership would not become widespread until the
1960s. 93 Yet the idea of programming stations with a black music format began
much sooner. Between the period of 1949 and 1956, four hundred stations
nationwide carried some form of black-oriented programming or were completely
black formatted. 94 By 1970, there were sixteen black owned and black formatted
stations. That number grew to over two hundred stations nationwide by 1986.95
The future growth of minority ownership was expected to be hampered by
potential problems, including lack of available licenses and more importantly,
difficulties in obtaining financing. 96 Financiers considered minority broadcast
ownership to be "high-risk" ventures. 97 Although the problems of ownership may

92

Co-ops, shorthand for cooperative advertising, are joint efforts between a retailer and a
manufacturer/supplier to share the cost of advertisements. In the case of broadcasting, co-ops allow
manufacturers to share the cost of making a commercial ad with a radio or television station. See, Ed
Shane, Selling Electronic Media (1999).
93 Barlow, supra note 84 at 246-247.
94 Id. at 245-257.
95 Negro Radio, supra note 93.
96 Bernard Rubin, "See Us, Hear Us, Know Me," in Small Voices and Great Triumphs: Minorities and the
Media 3-46 (Bernard Rubin, ed., 1980).
97 Id. Many of the owners did not have a great deal of broadcasting experience. Moreover, for those who
did, financiers considered investing in broadcast properties to be risky, as such properties were licensed and
controlled by government authorities.
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be acute for minorities, broadcast media in general is considered to be a risky
investment venture. 98 Corn-Revere noted the poor economic performance of the
broadcast industry in the early 1990s, as more than half of the radio stations on
the air had lost money. Yet a 1978 FCC task force report declared the lack of
minority participation would result in society being "deprived and unaware of
minority viewpoints and concerns." 99 At the time of the task force, minorities
owned less than one percent of the 8,500 commercial broadcast outlets. While
the figures improved slightly, minority ownership is still low. As of 1998, minorities
owned less than eight percent of the over 12,000 commercial AM and FM radio
stations in the United States. 100 Table 1 presents minority broadcast ownership
from 1993 until 1998.

MINORITY BROADCAST OWNERSHIP POLICIES
Noting the paucity of minority owners, several programs were designed to
promote ownership. The distress sale policy allowed broadcasters in danger of
losing their license to sell their station(s) to minorities for up to 75% of the fair
market value. 101 In spite of such a seemingly profitable and easy to use policy, it
has been relatively ineffective. Because of the lack of FCC commitment, there
were few opportunities to use the policy. The small number of renewal hearings
held by the FCC, in conjunction with the eight-year license term periods adopted

98
99

See, Alison Alexander, James Owers, & Rob Craveth, Media Economics: Theory and Practice 74 (1993).
Federal Communications Commission's Minority Ownership Task Force, Minority Ownership Report (May

17, 1978) [Hereinafter 1978 report].
National Telecommunication and Information Administration, Minority Broadcast Ownership in the United
States, (October 27, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98/>
101 Alan Stavitsky, The Rise and Fall of the Distress Sale, 36 JOURNALOF BROADCASTING
ANOELECTRONIC
MEDIA249 (1992).
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Table 1: Ownership of Minority vs. Non-Minority Broadcast Stations*

1993

1994

1995

19961997

1998

19992000

AM RADIO
4,590

4,929

4,906

4,814

4,724

BLACK

120

111

109

101

100

**211

HISPANIC

63

76

72

80

84

**187

ASIAN

0

1

2

1

4

**23

NATIVES

2

2

2

2

1

**5

4,920

5,044

5,285

5,468

5,591

BLACK

80

80

86

64

68

HISPANIC

23

35

34

31

46

ASIAN

2

3

3

2

1

NATIVES

3

3

4

3

1

1,151

1,155

1,221

1,193

1,209

BLACK

20

22

28

28

26

20

HISPANIC

8

9

9

9

6

2

ASIAN

1

1

1

1

0

1

NATIVES

0

0

0

0

0

0

INDUSTRY

**11,865

FM RADIO
INDUSTRY

TELEVISION
INDUSTRY

1,265

*Figures from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration reportsMinority
Broadcast Ownership in the United States (1998); Changes, Challenges and Charting New Courses:
Minority Broadcast Ownership in the United States (2000).
**These are aggregate numbers, representing both AM and FM ownership as ownership of
broadcast radio by frequency band and race was not pro'tded.
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in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, meant the chance for a station coming up
for revocation is slim.
Starting in 1965, enhancement credit in comparative hearings was a
method used to provide ownership opportunities. "Integration of ownership and
management" focused on broadcast station owners and their day-to-day
involvement with the operation and management of their stations. Minority and
gender preferences were both seen as aspects of "integration of ownership and
management." During competitive licensing hearings, "integration of ownership
and management" was given quantitative credit and weighed along with the other
licensing criteria. 102 This was very important because comparative hearings
decided who would construct a new station in cases where more than one
person or firm wanted to do so. However, in 1993 the United States Court of
Appeals (DC) prohibited the FCC from using integration credit in comparative
hearings .103
Probably the most well noted and most controversial of all the minority
preference programs was the minority tax certificate. Created in 1978, the
minority tax certificate encouraged sales of broadcast properties to minorities.
The policy originated from a section of the Internal Revenue Service tax codesection 1071. The tax certificate provided favorable tax treatment to sellers by
deferring taxable gain from the sale of their station(s), provided the buyer was a

102

Kenneth C. Creech, The Licensing Process in Electronic Media Law and Regulation 100- 111 (2nd ed.
1996). The other criteria used in this licensing process were diversification of control, proposed
programming, full-time participation by owner(s), past broadcast record, efficient use of frequency,
character, and other issues presented by applicants.
103 Bechtel V. FCC, 10 F.3D 875 (1993).
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minority. 104 There were several approaches to the tax certificate policy as well as
some revisions over its 17-year history. 105 But by 1995, minorities owned three
hundred and sixty stations. Many of those purchases used the tax certificate to
attract initial investors. 106 Three hundred and thirty tax certificates had been
issued with two hundred and sixty of those for radio transactions, forty for
television transactions, and thirty for cable television transactions. 107 In general,
the tax certificate policy had granted 507 certificates prior to its repeal in 1995.108
The proposed sale of Viacom's cable systems to a minority-led
communications group in 1995 through a tax certificate would have allowed
Viacom to defer $600 million dollars in taxes. That prompted Congress to
eliminate the tax certificate policy. 109 Many believed the repeal of the policy was
racially motivated because Viacom utilized other tax-free provisions to sell its
properties to a non-minority entity. 110 And while this exchange of cable stations
between Viacom and a minority owned company was blocked, in November

104 Kofi Ofori & Mark Llyod, The Value of the Tax Certificate, 51 FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
LAWJOURNAL
693,
702- 703 [Ofori and Llyod).
105 Id. The tax certificate could be used in three distinct ways: 1) the seller did not have to pay tax on any
gains from the sale provided the proceeds were used to purchase replacement property, 2) the gains from
the sale could be used to reduce the seller's basis in other depreciable property, or 3) use half of the gains
towards purchase of new property and the other half towards the reduction in depreciable property. In 1982,
the policy was amended to grant investors deferment on gains from sale of purchased stock in a minority
owned broadcast property/ company.
106 Erwin Krasnow, A Case for Minority Tax Certificates, BROADCASTING
ANDCABLE,December 15, 1997 at
80.
101 Id.
108 95-319 SPR, CRS Report for Congress, The Viacom Transaction and Beyond (March 2, 1995).
109 Id.
11 Krasnow, supra note 106; See also Erwin Krasnow and Lisa M. Fowlkes, FCC Minority Tax Certificate
Program: A Proposal for Life After Death, 51 FEDERAL
COMMUNICATION
L.J. 665 at 673 (1999).
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2000, Viacom purchased the largest black-owned cable channel- Black
Entertainment Television. 111
However, the minority tax certificate idea has begun to resurface. As
recently as 1998, Congress looked toward re-instating the program. 112 Mandatory
holding periods, limiting the number of times a certificate could be used,
screening of participants, and caps on the amounts deferrable are all new ways
in which the policy is being adjusted. 113 Although various mechanisms to prevent
abuses were explored in 2000, former FCC Chairman William Kennard, while
FCC General Counsel, offered many of the same suggestions in 1995. In
testimony before the United States Senate, Kennard presented alternative
methods of tightening the policy. 114 Specifically, Kennard discussed extending
holding periods for licensees, limiting the number of certificates that could be
used, and limiting the dollar amount of the deferral. However, the suggestion
made did not include specific numbers or figures as the FCC was still blocked
from making any changes to existing broadcast policy under the appropriation
riders.

BROADCAST EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Prior to the creation of specific minority ownership policies, employment
was viewed as a way to include minorities in the broadcast industry. In July 1969,

111 Geraldine Fabrikant, BET Holdings to be bought by Viacom for $2.34 billion, (November 7, 2000),
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/business/04viac.html>
112 Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, Minority Initiatives Advance, BROADCASTING
ANDCABLE,August 2, 1999
at 7.
113 Erwin Krasnow, Tax Certificate: New and Improved, BROADCASTING
ANDCABLE,June 28, 1999 at 14.
114 FCC's Tax Certificate Program, hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 104 th Congress (1995).
(Testimony of William Kennard, FCC General Counsel at 9-10).
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the FCC adopted rules that prohibited discrimination based on race, color,
religion, or origin. Those rules also required that equal opportunity in employment
be given to all qualified persons. License holders had to develop a program of
specific practices that would assure equal opportunity. 115
The FCC began requiring licensees to file annual reports, including written
equal employment policies and data, to insure minorities were given full
consideration.

116

The FCC eventually created a model EEO program. The policy

said, "An affirmative action plan is a set of specific and result-oriented
procedures which broadcasters must follow to assure that minorities and women
are given equal and full protection." 117 Today, all formalized EEO requirements in
broadcasting have been removed, as they were ruled invalid in Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod v. FCC. 118
The FCC argued that two church-related stations in Missouri were not
vigorous in their minority recruitment efforts. Those stations were fined as they
failed to comply with the FCC's EEO rules and regulations. Although the FCC
used a rational basis test when they applied their EEO guidelines, 119 the Court of
Appeals (DC) disagreed, stating that after the decision in Adarand v. Pena, 120 the

115 Federal Communications Commission, Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership of Broadcast
Facilities, 68 FCC 2D 979 [hereinafter Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership).
11s Id.
117 Non-Discrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 54 FCC2d 358
p975).
18 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (1998).
119 Black's, supra, note 49. In constitutional law, when a court uses a rational basis test it will uphold a law
valid under the equal protection clause only if it has a conceivable relationship to a legitimate government
o~ective.
12 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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FCC should have been using a standard of strict scrutiny. 121 The Supreme Court
ruled that affirmative action efforts that used racial classifications in awarding
contracts were to abide by strict scrutiny standards. The ruling affected all
federal, state, and local government agencies.
After weighing the policy under "strict scrutiny" guidelines established in

Adarand, the D.C. Court of Appeals decided the Commission's EEO policy had
no compelling interest. According to the court, the FCC failed to produce
evidence that non-programming positions that employed minorities affected the
outcome of overall programming diversity.
The FCC had asked the Court of Appeals not to pass any ruling on the
Missouri-Synod case. 122 Nevertheless, the case went forward. The National
Association of Black Journalists argued the removal of the EEO policies "raised
questions about access to the airwaves by African-Americans and other peoples
of color. "123 The EEO policy did help bolster minority employment in the industry
from 9% to almost 20% over a 25-year period. 124 Insiders speculated whether the
removal of the EEO policies meant the end of the industry's ability to enforce
affirmative action policies in general. 125
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FCC diversity plan loses on appeal, ABA JOURNAL,
July 1998 at 36.
Chris McConnell, FCC asks court to stay out of EEO case, BROADCASTING
ANDCABLE,March 9, 1998 at
12.The FCC informed that court they would send the case back to the FCC, the Commission planned to
reverse its earlier finding in the case and remove the reporting of employment portions of the policy.
123 Kelvin Childs, Black Journalists Blast Ruling, EDITOR
ANDPUBLISHER,
April 25, 1998 at 35.
124 Alicia Mundy, An unappealing decision, MEDIAWEEK,
June 1, 1998 at 18.
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DEREGULATING THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
The Reagan (and later Bush) presidencies marked what many believed
were the beginnings of widespread deregulation across many industries,
including communications.

126

In particular, President Reagan supported the

relaxation of restrictions in many private sectors in order to boost the economic
health of society and private industry. 127 Reagan's administration's rhetoric
invoked a desire to cut taxes, remove government from people's lives, balance
the budget, and increase military spending. 128 While President Reagan
drastically removed or limited spending for social programs such as food stamps,
and subsidized housing, 129 spending for the military increased. The cutting of
social programs coupled with the increase of military spending, according to
University of Nebraska Professor Ann Mari May, was detrimental to women and
minorities. 130 Women tended to be less supportive of President Reagan's
initiatives, as they favored less spending on military issues and more on social
services. 131
Besides the shifts in spending, President Reagan vowed to remove
government control of businesses. This was achieved through the removal or
relaxation of government regulations that supervised the conduct of

126

Horowitz, supra note 69 at 244-247.
Id. at 209
128 Lauren Tarshis, The Legacy of Reaganomics, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, March 6, 1992 at 10.
129 Id.
130 Ann Mari May, Women, economics, and the concept of the market: A second look at Reaganomics, 27
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 471 (1993).
1a1 Id.
127

31

businesses.

132

However, the plan to de-regulate many industries had mixed

results. 133 The airline industry began to experience massive buyouts, which
resulted in less competition and inflated prices passed on to consumers. 134 The
savings and loan disaster in the mid 1980s was another example of how less
government control harmed society. 135
Horowitz wrote that during the mid 1980s, the broadcasting industry
adopted the economic marketplace theory and used it as the basis for
deregulation.

136

According to William Ray, former chief of the FCC's Complaints

and Compliances division, under the leadership of FCC Chairman Mark Fowler
and later Chairman Dennis Patrick, the FCC" ... sought to nullify the entire
concept of the broadcaster as a public trustee."

137

Ray wrote that those

chairmen began to deregulate the industry from policies and issues they believed
hampered the broadcasters, such as the anti-trafficking rule (which made way for
the early attempts at mergers and consolidations). 138 It was said by Chairman
Fowler that competition would correct any deficiencies in programming.

132

Tarshis, supra note 128.
Id. at 14.
134 Id. at 14-15.
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136 Horowitz, supra note 69 at 244-246; Pool, supra note 73.
137 William B. Ray, FCC: The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regulation 163 (1990).
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Ray, supra note 137 argues that once this policy was abolished, stations were bought and sold at rapid
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When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed, it further relaxed
nationwide and local ownership limits. 139 For radio, old FCC rules did not permit
ownership of more than 20 FM or 20 AM stations nationwide. As of the 1996 Act,
there is no limit on radio ownership nationwide. Yet, there are local market
limitations. In markets with 45 or more commercial radio stations, an entity can
own up to 8 stations. In markets with 30-44 commercial radio stations, ownership
is capped at 7 stations. Markets with 15-29 commercial stations, ownership is
held to 6 stations. Lastly, in markets with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations,
an entity can own up to 5 stations, however one entity may not own, operate, or
control more than 50% of the stations in the market. All of these changes
prompted many companies to purchase radio and television stations at a rapid
pace. Large media outfits began merging with and buying out other
broadcasters. 140
As suggested by McChesney, radio station ownership had undergone
major transformations that resulted in four large companies controlling one-third
of all the industry's revenues. 141 Mergers and acquisitions generated huge
amounts of cash flow, which was used to finance future purchases. For minority
owners, the ability to convince banks, venture capitalists, or potential investors to

139 Under the former FCC rules, a single entity could not own more than 12 television stations nationwide or
television stations reaching more than 25% of the nation's television households. The 1996 Act eliminated
the 12-station limit and increased the maximum permissible audience reach to 35% nationwide.
140 Paul Farhl, For Radio Stations, Does Big Mean Bland? THEWASHINGTON
POST,July 1, 1996, at F5.
Author notes that between May and July of 1996, companies such as Evergreen and CBS/Westinghouse
made aggressive moves to purchase radio properties that not only gave those companies sizable control of
local markets, but also built their nationwide assets.
141 Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communications Politics in Dubious Times 18
(1999) [Hereinafter Rich Media, Poor Democracy].
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provide more cash for expansion became harder. 142 Current stations had to be
used as collateral for financing deals. Any attempt to buy more stations came at
the risk of potentially losing the currently owned stations through hostile
takeovers. 143
On the other hand, the inability to compete for advertising against large
group owned stations could also squeeze a minority owner out of the
broadcasting business. In 1997, a Birmingham-based minority broadcast
company sold its radio properties to industry giant Cox Radio. 144 (According to
Columbia Journalism Review's website, Cox Radio owned stations in the
following places: Los Angeles (4), Atlanta (4), Tampa (4), Miami (2), Orlando (7),
San Antonio (8), Louisville (3), Birmingham (7), Dayton (5), Tulsa (5), Syracuse
(5), and Bridgeport (1).) 145 The Birmingham minority radio group cited
competition from several local stations that were black formatted but white
owned. The competing stations were part of larger media conglomerates. That
allowed those stations to offer better advertising rates through combination sales
across stations.
Radio and television have seen increased concentration of ownership that
has resulted in less competition. 146 The total number of television group owners
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decreased between 1995 and 1997. 147 The mergers between broadcasting
groups, usually smaller ones being acquired by larger ones, seemed to be the
major cause of overall group ownership decline. 148 These consolidations and
mergers are believed to have been detrimental to listener choices in
programming. 149 Since there are fewer owners, the ability of those owners to
dictate advertising rates has negatively impacted other competitors.
Effects of Media Consolidation

There are also social effects and impacts of consolidation. The media
appear more interested in pleasing corporate owners and advertisers than
informing and providing a voice for the public. Citing the Telecommunications Act
and the resulting trend towards consolidation, McChesney referred to examples
such as the Disney and 20/20 fiasco 150 as inevitable outcomes. In 1998, ABC's
news program "20/20" refused to air an investigative report on Disney theme
parks and employment practices, which include inadequate screening for
pedophiles. Disney owns ABC.
Aptly put by McChesney, "the media ... exists as it does because powerful
interests have constructed it so that citizens will not be involved in the key policy
decisions .... "151 This certainly raises the issues of how a media system controlled
by private ownership can work to promote public interest and divergent views.

147 Herbert H. Howard, The 1996 Telecommunications Act and TV Station Ownership: One Year Later, 11
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OFMEDIAECONOMICS
26 (1998).
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149 Bruce E. Drushel, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Radio Market Structure, 11 THEJOURNAL
OF
MEDIAECONOMICS
16 (1998).
150 Id.
151 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 15.
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Furthermore, it is noted that the content of the press is often related to those who
finance the press. 152 And relationships, such as that between the tobacco
industry and the media, point to a longstanding, systemic influence on media
content. 153 Media scholar Ben Bagdikian also noted the potential danger of
corporate influences and interlocking directorates when he said,
"It is dangerous enough that in a democracy fifty corporate
chiefs have so much power over the national
consciousness and that this power can be exercised in
ways that serve other interests."154

McChesney acknowledged that an oligopolistic structure exists in the
media industry. 155 Oligopolies are characterized by market conditions in which
there are few sellers and the action of any single seller can affect price and have
a sizeable impact on other competitors. Many media companies are also
worldwide and have become what are known as transnational companies. These
companies are interwoven as many hold stocks in each other's businesses. 156
Their boards of directors have what McChesney called 'direct links'-

two or

more people serving on different executive boards of media firms and Fortune
1000 companies.

157

Similar to Bagdikian's concept of interlocking directorates,

McChesney's 'direct links' are not only interwoven with one another, but with the
larger corporate community.

152 Pamela J. Shoemaker & Stephen D. Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on Mass
Media Content 162 (1991).
153 Id.
154 Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly 20 (1983).
155 Robert Mcchesney, Big Media Game Has Fewer and Fewer Players, THE PROGRESSIVE,
November 1,
1999 at 20 [hereinafter Big media].
156 Robert Mcchesney, It's a Small World of Big Conglomerates, THE NATION,November 29, 1999 at 11
~hereinafter Small world].
57 Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141 at 29.
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Media giants also tend to participate in "equity joint ventures." 158 In these
ventures, two or more companies assume ownership of certain media projects.
The financial risk is spread around, so no one company takes an unusually hard
hit. The advertising revenue is also shared, thereby reducing competition among
the companies for advertising dollars. 159 This tendency to share what
McChesney called "interlocking relationships" is dangerous because most
corporations support a very conservative, mainstream agenda. Shoemaker and
Reese suggested that financial institutions could end up controlling the basic
decisions in media corporations or large media institutions may become
dependent on the resources controlled by financial institutions.

160

There is general concern that the blitz of mergers and consolidations
poses a threat to diversity of voices. When huge media companies own multiple
stations in a market, the ability for smaller, minority owned stations to obtain
necessary revenue is greatly diminished. More minority owners may sell their
properties as their capacity to buy more stations and attract advertising dollars
has decreased. 161 It is argued that consolidation, particularly in radio, allows an
owner to focus on one type of musical format and buy up the competition,
effectively dominating huge chunks of the broadcast markets' offerings. 162 That is
not to say that all owners will follow that course of action. However, consolidation
has the potential to leave listeners with fewer musical choices.
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Impacts on Minority Ownership

Advertising Discrimination
For years, minority owners have complained of discriminatory practices in
broadcast sales and advertising. These practices, usually seen in agencies, tend
to view minority consumers as unimportant. 163 As such, the agencies do not push
"advertising buys" on minority-owned stations. And while in some markets
minority owned media are the leaders, their revenue streams do not match their
rankings. 164 Across radio formats (such as black, urban, Spanish, ethnic, and
general) in the top 200 markets, white-owned stations earned more revenue than
minority-owned stations. 165 On average the revenue stream for white- owned
radio stations is approximately $3.5 million dollars per year, while black- owned
stations take in $2.6 million dollars per year regardless of format. 166
Stations that are minority programmed are often unable to earn revenue
comparable to "general" formatted stations. This can be attributed to many
factors including media consolidation, group ownership, non-urban dictates and
minority discounts, along with subtle race discrimination. In a study conducted by
Kofi Ofori (director of research at the Civil Rights Forum on Communications
Policy) and commissioned by the FCC, non-urban dictates were identified as the
practice of barring the placement of advertising on Spanish or urban formatted
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radio stations. 167 Minority discounts is the system of buying time on urban and
Spanish formatted stations at rates far less than would be paid to general
formatted stations of a comparable size in a comparable market. 168 Non-urban
dictates and discounts usually take place at the advertising agency level,
although individual businesses often discriminate and refuse to place ads on
Spanish and urban formatted stations as well. Because of these reduced rates
and/or outright refusal of ad placements, minority owned stations tend to earn
less advertising revenue than non-minority broadcasters. 169
Financial Barriers
Several published reports from the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) concluded that deregulation, consolidation,
and discrimination were contributors to the declining number of minority owned
media. 170 Elevated prices for stations and lack of advertising dollars were just a
few of the effects. Some have predicted broadcast station prices at 20x cash
flow. 171 For example, it can cost as much as $20 million dollars to enter the FM
side of radio in any of the larger broadcast markets. 172 Ragan Henry, founder of
the black owned US Radio Inc., sold his stations to Clear Channel
Communications for $140 million dollars. 173 He said that his financial investors
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were reluctant to provide him with more money to buy expensive stations.
Without the tax certificate and the lack of available equity financing, Mr. Henry
encountered hurdles he felt he could not overcome. (Clear Channel, the
company that bought out Mr. Henry came under fire in 1999 when on-air
personalities at one of their Ohio market stations, made racially offensive
statements.

174

As a result, the station apologized and instituted proposals to

bring about racial diversity in hopes of reaching out to the community.)
Financial and technical barriers exist in markets and among competitors,
regardless of race. In the case of broadcast markets, there are few available
frequencies left to apply for. 175 In order for a broadcaster to gain entrance, an
existing station must be acquired. As previously discussed, prices for radio
stations have dramatically increased. 176 Notwithstanding the daily financial
expenditures in broadcast operations, such as payroll and programming, new
entrants must also worry about the effects of rapid consolidation.
McChesney observed that about eight conglomerates control much of the
world's media. 177 And locally, it is typical for three to four media companies to
control almost all of a market's radio stations. Robert Johnson, former owner and
president of Black Entertainment Television (a cable channel that programs to

Combined they owned 35 stations. Ragan Henry indicated that he would have preferred to hold on to those
stations. The deregulating of the industry has sent station prices soaring and as Henry noted stations are
now being valued at 15x cash flow, as compared to the figure of Bx cash flow just a few years ago.
174 Toledo Radio Stations Pledge to be More Sensitive to Minority Issues, Associated Press Newswire,
March 24, 2000.
175 Alan B. Albarran, Radio Industry, in Media Economics: Understanding Markets, Industries, and Concepts
(1st ed. 1996).
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Rich Media, Poor Democracy, supra note 141. McChesney referred to the eight major conglomerates
that have a heavy hand in media and broadcast communications worldwide: Disney, Time Warner (which
merged in 2000 with AOL), Viacom, Seagram, Bertelsmann, General Electric, and AT & T.
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African-Americans) perceived large conglomerates would eventually control
broadcast media, effectively pushing out the smaller voices. 178 Johnson also
stated that media consolidation blocks out agendas and concerns that are not
important to those in control. 179 Media consolidation is a threat to minority
broadcast ownership and a contributor to the elimination of local programming. 180
Various black-owned broadcasting groups have sold their properties to bigger
companies.

181

However, it is a general belief that large media operations have

more resources to effectively compete in the media market, thus race may not
always be considered the sole factor. Nevertheless, other minority broadcast
owners are expected to follow suit as their ability to survive has dwindled. 182 If
minority owners cannot acquire other stations, obtain strong advertising revenue,
and manage the daily finances of a station, then their chances of survival are
slim.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Anti-discrimination law and its legislative foundation can be found in Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 183 This provision of the 1964 Act prohibits
discrimination based on sex, color, gender, or national origin. This provision also

178 Robert Johnson, The First Amendment Speech You've Never Heard Before, BROADCASTING
& CABLE,
May 19, 1997, at 22-23. However,Robert Johnson recently sold BET to multi-media giant, Viacom, for $2.34
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created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], which is
charged with upholding the law proscribed through Title VII.
According to Carter Wilson, a University of Toledo professor, during its
initial years the EEOC was ineffective because it suffered from limited resources,
limited statutory authority, and operated under a politically conservative
framework.

184

This meant the Commission operated on a case-by-case basis,

viewing discrimination as an individual problem as opposed to a systemic
problem. 185 Of the 100,000 employment discrimination complaints received at
the EEOC during its first seven years in existence, only 41,000 were investigated
and only 2,460 were successfully resolved. A key factor in the seemingly weak
enforcement of Title VII complaints was that the EEOC lacked the power to bring
lawsuits against firms. The EEOC had to turn many cases over to the Justice
Department for further investigation and/or prosecution.
In the 1970s, anti-discrimination policies became more effective. Wilson
described how the EEOC and the courts began to view anti-discrimination
policies in a more expansive framework. Institutional forms of discrimination were
being recognized. 186 The EEOC moved to implement an industry-wide approach
in dealing with discrimination, no longer using a case-by-case approach. 187
Affirmative action plans had begun to be used to remedy discrimination. Most
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importantly, the EEOC had the newfound power to initiate lawsuits against firms
that discriminated.
Equal opportunity is crucial for all people, but especially for those who
have been historically denied privileges. Congressional Digest described equal
opportunity in several ways. 188 Affirmative action, as defined by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, includes any measure adopted to correct or
compensate for past/present discrimination or prevention of future recurring
discrimination. Affirmative action has two elements: a voluntary and a mandated
effort to ensure minorities and women are given equal opportunity in education,
employment and other areas. 189 Equality of opportunity is the idea that all people
should be able to equally compete, perform and succeed on their merits without
being discriminated against because of their race, sex or other characteristics.
As a goal of affirmative action, equality of results is not as simple. Those
who oppose affirmative action say a system seeking equal results is designed to
give people an advantage based on their membership in a protected group.
Supporters argue that the lack of minority participation is indicative of the lack of
opportunity. Members of marginalized or minority groups do not start at the same
level as society at large, so trying to root out discrimination case by case is
ineffective.
Affirmative action programs use a classification structure and are
designed to correct a tangible, evident problem. In order to classify groups for

188
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CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST

162- 164 (1996).

special treatment, the goals of affirmative action programs should be narrowly
defined and target a government interest. Providing protection for a class of
people (defined by race) is a violation of the Constitution, unless it can be proven
that such classification identifies and corrects past injustice. In the case of
broadcast minority preferences, distress policies and tax certificates were seen
as ways to overcome prior discrimination.
These policies did not use specific, past instances of discrimination as
their explicit purpose. As a result, many of the legal arguments against these
minority ownership policies have cited equal protection clause violations. The
equal protection clause regulates the government's ability to classify people for
obtaining benefits or administering punishments. The equal protection clause
provides for similar treatment of all people in like circumstances. Nevertheless,
minority ownership preferences and policies were created to foster the concepts
of diversity and to increase the presence of minority groups in broadcast media.
While minority preferences initially passed judicial muster as serving a
substantial government interest, 190 opponents have continued to argue that such
policies infringed on the constitutional rights of others and failed to present a
logical connection to programming. 191 Schement & Singleton studied the
relationship between minority ownership and minority programming and
concluded Spanish-owned stations fared no better or worse than white owned

190

As seen through Congress's actions in the 1980s to stop FCC revocation of minority preferences.
Howard Kleiman, Content Diversity and the FCC's Minority And Gender Licensing Policies, 35 JOURNAL
OF BROADCASTING
ANDELECTRONIC
MEDIA,411 at 421 (1991).
191

44

stations in terms of minority programming.

192

A subsequent study found no

significant relationship between race, ownership and quantity of programming. 193
Other studies reinforced this tenuous connection between race, programming, 194
and ownership. 195 Even without a clear empirical connection between minority
ownership and programming, inclusion of minorities in media ownership was said
to promote a more open, accepting and reflective society. 196
Besides the belief that minority ownership would help in the promotion of a
more reflective society, Gauger's analysis concluded that race based
preferences did not unnecessarily abridge the rights of adversely affected
parties. 197 Other scholarship indicated "tangible" benefits to minority ownership,
such as better programming. 198 In 1988, the Congressional Research Service
found some correlation between minority ownership and programming. 199 Of the
stations that were not owned by minorities, only twenty percent provided

192 Jorge Reina Schement and Loy A. Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership: FCC Policy and SpanishOFCOMMUNICATION,
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programming for minorities. However, of the minority owned stations, sixty-five
percent provided programming for minorities. 200
The need for minority ownership also was reflected in studies that linked
minority ownership to better employment opportunities for minorities. 201
Nevertheless, Stone found minorities working in broadcast news were not
employed in positions that led to managerial opportunities. 202 This was especially
true for minority males, as they were concentrated in low paying jobs such as
cameramen and photographers. Women, however, were seen more often in
reporting and anchoring positions. 203 Profiles of television and radio news
directors found women (mostly white women) were making rapid advancements
in news management, although minority advancement was minimal, a one
percent increase over a four-year period. 204 In addition, a ten-year study showed
the total broadcast industry workforce had increased by thirty five percent but
minority employment had decreased, particularly for black males. 205
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OWNERSHIP POLICIES AND THE FCC
Perhaps the lack of minority involvement in broadcast ownership and the
ineffectiveness of minority broadcast policies was due to weak enforcement of
FCC policies. 206 For example, the Commission initiated an ascertainment
requirement policy in 1960. Broadcasters were required to go into the community
and speak with various leaders and groups to determine the type of people who
lived there, the kinds of concerns and interests those people had, and how they
[broadcasters] could meet those concerns. The FCC designated certain
institutions that broadcasters should seek out and interview about community
concerns. 207 When the ascertainment requirements were undermined and
eventually eliminated in 1981, it became more difficult for citizen groups to
question station efforts to serve underrepresented members of the community. 208
Challenging station licenses was another way in which citizen groups sought to
voice their concerns. Hundreds of citizen complaints were lodged over an eightyear period, yet the FCC failed to hold any hearings, 209 and over a ten-year
period, the FCC had one hundred and twenty renewal challenges but only
granted three hearings. 210

206
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Additional research suggested a history of racism at the FCC in its early
years might have affected minority ownership and participation in the industry.
The WLBT-TV

211

case is the often referenced as evidence of FCC denial of

community groups' grievances in relation to programming. 212 Citizens and
advocacy groups in Jackson, Mississippi, petitioned the FCC to deny WLBT's
license renewal application. The formal petition stated, among other things, that
WLBT failed to serve the black population of Jackson, the programming was
unfair and discriminatory against blacks, and their treatment of racial and
integrationist issues was unfair and inadequate. Although the petitioners had
gathered evidence to support their case, the FCC granted a one-year conditional
renewal to the station, provided WLBT improved its programming. Instead of fully
investigating the claims of the petitioners, the FCC declared the petitioners did
not have standing. 213 Petitioners appealed the case to the D.C. Court in 1966.
The Court remanded the case back to the FCC for further consideration. The
Commission held formal hearings on the renewal of WLBT's license and
subsequently renewed the license. Upon a second appeal to the D.C. Court in
1969, WLBT's license was removed.
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"the holders of broadcasting licenses be responsive to the
needs of the audience without which the broadcaster could
not now exist." 215

Some have argued that the failure of minority preferences in broadcasting
rested with FCC construction of minority ownership policies, 216 while others
concluded preference policies were subjects of great support or opposition as
they hinged upon court interpretation of constitutional law.217 According to
Anastos, other explanations for failure of minority ownership policies claimed
people who were not in need of the policies used loopholes to take advantage. 218
And while loopholes are bound to exist with any policy, Hart stated the policies
themselves were of extreme value and importance. 219

BROADCAST REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
Deregulation has had a profound impact on minority participation in the
broadcast industry. Deregulation was predicted as being potentially contrary to
minority interests, as it would allow the commercial market to determine
allocation of media properties. 220 As such, the highest bidder would be able to
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purchase broadcast properties. Socioeconomic factors would preclude the
existence of minority advocacy and a market failure would exist for minority
programming. 221 Economic changes influenced shifts in political power. Those
changes contributed to high concentrations of wealth in the upper class. 222 As
conservative forces grew strong, civil rights forces weakened. This shift in power
allowed the corporate sector to become more politically active, 223 as McChesney
stated companies such as Time Warner and Disney "have their own lobbying
machines. "224
Private ownership of capital sources (such as those in the broadcasting
and communications industry) indicates that investments and policies tend to
profit and help accumulate wealth, not to satisfy human (listeners or viewers)
needs. 225 A deregulated broadcast environment, according to Schmeltzer, would
provide little incentive for broadcasters to serve minorities, 226 would reduce
competition and diversity, 227 and would only serve advertisers and profit
appeals. 228 Yet broadcasters are licensed to serve in the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" as evidenced by that phrase's inclusion in the 1996
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Telecommunications Act. 229 As guardians of the public airwaves, that implies a
certain responsibility to the public regarding programming.
The FCC historically used several rationales for regulating in the public
interest. One was the "scarcity" argument. 230 There was limited channel
availability, so not every citizen would be able to broadcast. Licensing was
created as a way to ensure that diverse ideas were being introduced into society.
However, "scarcity" in the technical sense no longer has the same meaning as it
once held, especially with the emergence of additional programming sources like
cable, independent stations, digital broadcast satellites, etc.
Some studies have theorized that as the number of channels increase,
more minority and diverse programming will be provided. 231 Although there are
multitudes of programming outlets, some have noted minority access or
participation is still relatively low.232 According to Minow, enlarged choice may
not be enough to satisfy the public interest, as some viewers will be excluded. 233
Choices, such as cable television, come with a huge price that many people will
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be unable to afford. 234 And despite the growth of pay-per-view services in the last
twenty years, television still has the most significance for addressing minority
programming as approximately one-third of television homes in the United States
rely on commercial television as their sole means of broadcast programming. 235
Another rationale used for regulating in the public interest was diversity of
programming and information. Long standing as a basic tenet of broadcast
regulation law, diversity of programming has its root in a 1943 Supreme Court
case. 236 The FCC's decision to provide for minority representation was designed
to foster "unrestricted flow of ideas and equal opportunities for all."237 To that
end, the FCC implemented rules that offered equal opportunities in all licensees
and permittees. 238
Overall, the value of encouraging a wide range of voices and opinions has
been asserted as a fundamental principle of the First Amendment and has been
used by regulators and courts to sustain broadcasting polices. Yet, broadcasters
have not presented a wider range of programming nor diversity within
programming. A 1981 study indicated blacks were shown less frequently than in
previous years, black females were invisible, but whites of both sexes had
increased their representation in major roles.239 A 1989 survey conducted by the
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Center for Media and Public Affairs showed that minorities were rarely seen as
anchors and reporters on network evening newscasts.

240

The survey found no

blacks, no Asians, and only two Latinos-- Juan Vasquez on CBS and John
Quinones on ABC. Ziegler and White's study, which investigated network news
and the role of sex and race on newscasts, found most correspondents were
white and male and the representation of women and minorities changed very
little on television, even though the number of minorities in the population
continued to increase. 241
Other studies have examined the effects of programming formats on
portrayals of minority groups. For reality based shows such as "Cops," research
showed white characters were likely to be depicted as law enforcement, while
perpetrators and criminal suspects were overwhelming black and Hispanic
characters. 242 As part of President William Clinton's initiative on race dialogue, a
1998 study conducted by communications scholar Robert Entman investigated
the issue of race and stereotypes. 243 The study found high visibility of blacks, but
in stereotypical roles. Additionally, the study noted the invisibility of other
minorities who are not black. Other research has studied portrayals of other
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minority groups, such as Asian Americans, finding evidence of overrepresentation of such portrayals as compared to actual population figures. 244
Overwhelmingly, black portrayals were seen more on black programs
while white characters were seen more on white programs. 245 Black characters
on black programs were more stereotypical, exhibited more personal problems,
and had lower social status. In contrast, black characters on integrated shows
displayed greater social values, exhibited community problems, and had higher
social status. 246 Interviews with writers, producers, and talent agents in Los
Angeles revealed that what the average person thought someone in a particular
role should look like was an important factor in making casting decisions. 247 A
producer stated:
"By a damn sight, you would be far more likely to accept a
white or Chicano policeman in Beverly Hills than a black
policeman ...Why should I start arguments in a living room
or a den between husband and wife? I mean, why make a
point out of something that's not a point?"248

When blacks did appear in programming, their roles were usually
unrealistic compared to the actual world. 249 The 'televised' labor market did not
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resemble the actual labor market except for farm workers and managerial
depictions. 250 Portrayals of various racial and ethnic groups were not comparable
with their numbers in the population. In some cases, there seemed to be overrepresentation of minorities in the televised "labor market." Most occupational
portrayals of blacks were as law enforcement officers or entertainers, with underrepresentation of less prestigious occupations. 251
Programming affects how minorities view themselves. There is a strong
relationship between race and perceptions of black television characters. Blacks
tend to relate to black characters on television. 252 In addition, programming can
connect people to positive and negative images about themselves and members
of other groups. For example, "All in The Family" had high enjoyment from both
high and low prejudice viewers. However, high prejudice persons watched "All in
The Family" more than low prejudiced persons. These viewers admired Archie
(antagonist) over Mike (protagonist) and believed Archie made better sense. 253
The public's ability to be informed on a variety of issues, through
programming or other ways, has continued to be a strong goal of regulators.
However, the way to accomplish this task is no longer through the accountability
of broadcasters to the public. Deregulation centers broadcaster accountability in
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the marketplace. In spite of that, evidence shows that minority groups are less
able to afford access to new media (such as cable, satellite, etc.) and continue to
view traditional media as their way to receive information and programming. 254
As the market is left to dictate programming choices, the industry's ability to
serve minority interests and tastes dwindles. 255 Wimmer's discussion of minority
issues in broadcasting noted that in 1983, the large networks devoted less than
30 seconds per day to minority programming interests. 256
The NAACP president, Kweisi Mfume, criticized the broadcast networks
for lack of diversity within their programs. 257 While newer networks such as
Warner Brothers' WB Network and Rupert Murdoch's Fox Network have
attempted to provide some minority programming, the traditional three networks
(ABC, CBS, and NBC) are still far behind. None of the twenty-six shows
scheduled for the fall 1999-television season had a minority person in a
prominent role. 258 Another contributing factor is that only fifty-five of the eight
hundred and thirty-nine writers who work on television dramas and comedies are
black. The majority of those black writers work for the WB or United Paramount's
network-- UPN. 259
USA Today had the same opinion of the fall 1999 TV season. In a
featured cover story, the fall line-up of shows was described as being unreflective
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of American society. 260 Not only were the story lines and accompanying casts
focused on young, urban, and beautiful characters, but those characters and the
storylines were white-oriented. 261

CRITICAL RACE THEORY
Critical race theory is composed of many theoretical strands, some of
which are connected to the dissertation topic. The "constitution is color blind" and
the interest-convergence theory are theoretical strands that can help explain the
failure of minority ownership polices. They can help show why the policies have
been unsuccessful to this point. In addition, these legal theories provide insight
into what can be done to craft and implement minority ownership policies in a
more effective manner.
The Constitution is Color-Blind

Kimberle Crenshaw, a well-known critical race theorist, remarked that the
Reagan administration symbolized the emergence of hostility towards civil rights
and affirmative action policies.262 The Reagan and Bush administrations sought
to restore a conservative standard in civil rights laws.263 There was an active
campaign against affirmative action, as both administrations promoted raceneutral policies that insisted upon proof of discrimination. Furthermore, President
Reagan's administration saw the EEOC returning to a case-by-case approach
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that was indicative of the Commission's conservative approach prior to the
1970s. 264 This new hostility towards affirmative action was transformed into a
formalistic, "color blind" view of civil rights, although the move towards
deregulation began prior to the Reagan and Bush presidencies. However, this
"color blind" view of civil rights and the Constitution called for the removal of
affirmative action and other preference based policies. Color-blind rhetoric was
transformed in the broadcasting industry through broadcast deregulation. The
removal of broadcast policies such as ascertainment, anti-trafficking, and license
challenges were ways to relax industry and remove the voice of marginalized
persons.
While the Supreme Court has held racial subordination of any group as an
isolated phenomenon, Gotanda contended this viewpoint hinders society's ability
to address the connection between minorities and racism. 265 The "color blind"
theory limited available remedies only to "actual victims" of discrimination;
meaning only those people who could prove a visible injury of some kind. 266
Freeman argued that anti-discrimination law was embedded in the
"perpetrator" viewpoint. 267 In this viewpoint, racial discrimination is viewed as a
series of actions inflicted upon a victim by a specific perpetrator. Racial
discrimination is simply the misguided actions of a few individuals, not a social
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phenomenon. Remedies become case specific as their objective is neutralizing
the inappropriate conduct of the perpetrator. 268 The overall focus is on the
specific action rather than the overall existence of the victim and the racial
subordination.

269

Affirmative action, as an equalizer, looks to redistribute power, resources,
and wealth. 270 Harris argued that affirmative action, "dismantles the actual and
expected privilege that has attended white skin.". 271 The origin of inherent
property rights in whiteness is deeply rooted in race discrimination and slavery.272
White identity and being white were sources of protection from being enslaved.
Blacks were imported into the United States as tools of labor and were labeled as
property. 273 This resulted in the legalization of slavery which allowed blacks to be
sold, used as collateral, transferred, or used sources of currency- all
characteristics of property. 274 This institutional system was codified in the United
States Constitution through the Representation Clause where blacks were
classified as 3/5 of all other persons. 275 Race was critical as being white was
equated with freedom. 276
Historical and social contexts, such as slavery and the original intent of the
Constitution's framers, are a part of the "victim" perspective of affirmative action.
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From this perspective, racial discrimination consists of existing social conditions
(e.g. housing, money, employment), as well as the mental state associated with
those conditions. Freeman argued that when race discrimination is viewed
holistically and when the steps to remove the discrimination are systematic, only
then can racial balance and equity be achieved. 277 Similar to this perspective is
what Crenshaw called the expansive view of anti-discrimination law.278 The
expansive view characterizes equality as a result and it tries to identify real
consequences for racial groups.
Minority ownership and preferences share concepts akin to the "victim"
viewpoint. Reflecting on barriers such as lack of capital, lack of viable properties,
and bias in advertising, supporters refer to the systematic nature in which
minorities have been excluded from ownership.
To counter, opponents claimed such policies served to "stereotype"
minorities with a single voice. 279 While not all minorities think the same way,
critical race theorist Patricia Williams contended equating minority ownership
policies and preferences with a stereotype of the single voice is inaccurate. 280
There exist culturally and historically shared experiences within each minority
group and society as a whole. What minority ownership policies seek to
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accomplish is a more reflective media, accommodating other interpretations,
images, and views- not typecasting all minorities with one, monolithic voice.
The Interest-Convergence Theory

Discrimination can be described as a collection of behaviors, beliefs, and
customs embedded in our society. According to legal scholar and critical race
theorist Derrick Bell, it is the inability of whites to recognize and accept the fact
that discrimination still exists that hinders overall efforts to achieve racial
balance. 281 Whites are not willing to accept accountability for the problems that
exist nor do they deem any level of personal sacrifice necessary to right
systematic or societal wrongs. The evidence that whites are still unable to accept
the deep-rooted effects of racism is evident in the continued debate over
affirmative action and preferential programs. 282
Bell contends that racial equality will only happen when that equality
merges and is in alignment with the interest of the white majority. 283 The need to
remain superior hinders whites from understanding the need to allow racial
minorities to exert their social and political muscle. This convergence of interest
undermines the efforts to eradicate discrimination by focusing the spotlight on
preserving the socio-economic status of upper class whites. The theory asserts
that whites will only allow social and economic progress of racial minorities
insofar as it does not encroach on what whites feel they are naturally entitled.
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What motivates the resistance to racial equality is the perception (belief) by
whites that any gains by minority groups will threaten the white majority's sense
of entitlement to preferential treatment and superiority over minority groups. 284
To wonder why whites would feel the need to hinder the removal of racial
barriers is difficult. However, one cannot dismiss various efforts by the white
majority to limit progress of racial minorities, under the guise of public interest,
race-neutrality, and other concerns. The repeal of the minority tax certificate was
placed in such a context. In order to provide a health care provision for small
business owners, the tax certificate needed to be removed. The program was
removed based on a deal to a minority led cable group and the wish to supply a
health care policy for small business owners. Interests that were very different
and an instance where a policy aimed at rectifying inequalities in ownership were
dismissed for a "greater societal good."
While the federal courts now assess 14th Amendment violations under the
strict scrutiny standard of review, Bell argued there may be more to this blanket
approach to equal protection and constitutional guarantees. 285 Remedies that are
achieved under strict scrutiny review may be an external expression of
subconscious judicial need to protect the status of upper and middle class
whites. 286 As such, the meaning of the policy and its subsequent remedy (which
should be justice for the disadvantaged and racial balance) is never achieved.
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Even if one disagrees with the idea of a judicial subconscious playing a
role in remedying discrimination, viewing racial discrimination and discriminatory
actions under a standard of strict review might pose as a legal obstruction to
achieving racial balance. Discriminatory actions must now be linked to intentional
conflict of some kind and remedies are targeted at punishing specific entities. 287
It is often difficult to distinguish from intentional and unintentional acts.
Furthermore, a requirement of intentional conflict can diminish the importance of
social and historical factors that contributes to racial inequality- factors that
cannot be easily identified, but are embedded in our society.
For broadcast ownership, minorities have faced the same challenges for
years. Many of those challenges are direct results of overt and subtle bias, such
as advertising discrimination. The minority ownership policies were cognizant of
the long social and even industry discrimination towards minority participation.
However, the acceptance of the colorblind theory by the courts has diminished
the importance of understanding such information.
Race does matter because it reveals something about the person and
links to a larger, cultural identity. It is a filter through which all people see the
world and themselves. Many whites think minorities are obsessed with race and
fail to understand why race is so important. However, communications
scholarship has found race to be important to self-awareness, self-esteem and
socialization.
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CHAPTER Ill: METHODS
According to Wren and Wren, researching the law is often necessary to
learn the consequences of a specific set of facts. 288 For this reason, legal
research was selected as the method of investigation. While an understanding of
the set of facts that underlie a case or statute is important, legal research can
help make clear the roles that social and political processes play in shaping our
laws. Legal research can serve largely adversarial goals. However, Gillmor &
Dennis 289 stated that legal research could also accomplish several things:
Clarifying the law through the examination of case precedents or
procedures.
Advocating reformation of old laws and creation of new ones.
Giving clear understanding of how the law operates for people and
within society.
Gillmor and Dennis described a variety of ways to conduct legal
research. 290 Traditional legal research focuses on the exhaustive analysis of
legal materials related to a specific area of law, for example, analysis aimed at
finding rules of law from statutes, administrative agency decisions, executive
orders or court decisions. Empirical legal research and behavioral legal research
use methodologies found in social sciences as they recognize the complexities
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and circumstances of the law. Context, as a tool of legal research, calls for the
understanding of legal issues that may have origins in areas unrelated to the
phenomenon being studied. It remains important to know that legal research is
often done to support a particular position. Only a small percentage of legal
research is conducted just for the sake of knowing.
Several factors distinguish legal research from traditional scientific
research. Social scientific research seeks to emphasize general aspects of a
phenomenon. While social science research looks for connection between
various phenomenon, empirically based testing is customarily used to make
those connections. Legal research is concerned with the uniqueness of a case
and often uses reasoning by analogy-

case B is like case A. Stare decisis refers

to the principle of precedent. This principle requires the adherence to rulings in
similarly patterned cases by following the principles that prior courts and judges
have established. 291 Although precedents may be distinguished (saying case Bis
really not like case A) or overruled, courts are reluctant to do so unless it is
apparent that the former rule would be clearly unjust in present circumstances.
Legal research also differs from social scientific research because it does
not deal with probabilities or uncertainties, and is heavily oriented towards the
past. In social scientific research, theory is composed of related, abstract
statements that are empirically linked and explain a human behavior or condition.
The concept of theory has a different purpose when used in legal research.
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Theory in law focuses on explaining the rationale or explaining the specifics on
which an action is claimed to exist or not exist.
Despite the differences among social scientific forms of communications
research, legal research is one of the oldest areas of communication research.
Legal research lends itself to a variety of other fields of study, including history,
economics and philosophy. 292 Legal research has begun to incorporate elements
of social science research. Although this kind of application is relatively new,
what exists proves to be potentially useful to making sense of the law. 293 Gillmor
and Dennis note that scholars are moving away from the dogmatic, intrinsic
aspects of law. Many are exploring the extrinsic factors that can influence the
courts and the law, such as politics, elections, 294 and in the case of this
dissertation, race.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Legal research methods were used to conduct this study. Overall, legal
analysis took place in three parts. First, there was identification of a collection of
United States district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court cases in the area
of minority ownership and minority ownership policies promoted by the FCC.
Second, analysis of cases consisted of reviewing majority and dissenting
opinions. Third, placing majority and dissenting opinions in the framework of
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critical race theory, the study continued with determining the judicial rationale and
arguments.
Legal research relies heavily on existing documents and materials, which
also adds a historical dimension to the study as well. The materials used in legal
research are generally differentiated in terms of primary and secondary authority.
Primary authority is described as anything that constitutes the law.295 Local,
state and federal legislation, judicial case law, administrative regulations and
decisions, legislative histories, as well as rules of procedure are all sources of
primary authority. 296 Using primary authority provides not only a firm legal basis
for any argument, but also shows where such arguments have taken place in the
law.
Secondary authority is information and resources that are created by
individuals and non-governmental bodies to attempt to interpret or explain
primary authority. 297 Secondary authority includes treatises, restatements,
periodicals, journals (academic and law), newspapers, encyclopedias,
pamphlets, Internet, microforms, and other such materials. 298 Usage of
secondary authority is important for many reasons. First, such sources can lead
to the discovery of primary authority. Next, secondary authority provides
specialized analysis or a distinct viewpoint of a specific argument. 299
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Both primary and secondary authorities were integral to this research.
Primary authority was located through Lexis-Nexis Universe and West Law
databases. The key research phrases used in the databases searches were: 1)
ownership, 2) broadcast ownership, 3) radio, 4) television, 5) broadcast policies,
6) broadcast preferences, 7) communications policies, 8) minorities, 9) black, 10)
Afro-American, 11) distress sales, 12) comparative hearings, 13) racial
preferences, and 14) minority tax certificates. These research phrases were used
in together in a variety of search patterns.
To locate secondary authority materials, Lexis-Nexis Universe and
Lega/Trac were used to find law review articles. Academic and industry sources
were identified using ProQuest, CommAbstracts, Dissertation Abstracts, Dow
Jones Interactive and Uncover databases.
The citation style used for this dissertation is, A Uniform System of
Citation: The BlueBook, sixteenth edition. This citation is the standard form used
in legal research and writing.

DELIMITATIONS
While this dissertation covers an expansive period of judicial decisions
and government regulations, there are some acknowledged limitations of this
study. The author has delimited the types of persons involved, the types of cases
used for analysis, and the subject matter of the cases, in order to focus on a
narrower issue.
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Race versus Gender Issues

According to the FCC, a minority individual is defined as an American
Indian, Black (not of Hispanic origin), American Eskimo, Hispanic, Aleut, or
Asiatic American. 300 Although the courts or the government have rarely
recognized such a connection, women disadvantaged by workforce
discrimination might very well fit the description of a minority. 301 Socially, a
minority person can be defined as anyone that is not of the majority. In the United
States, the majority culture is described as being white and Eurocentric.
While it is conceivable to examine all cases involving these designated
minorities, the 2000 Census reported that of the 281 million people in the United
States, African Americans constituted 34 million or 12% of the population.
American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut populations stood at 2.4 million, Asian
population stood at 10 million, and Pacific Islanders were estimated to be close
to 400,000 people. Lastly, Hispanic population estimates were 35 million
people. 302
Even though Hispanics are now considered the largest minority, there are
several reasons why this study focuses on African-Americans as the population
group for analysis. First, population estimates and figures identify AfricanAmericans as a very large group of people, trailing Hispanics only slightly.
Second, the analysis of cases involving other minority groups would have yielded
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relatively few cases for analysis. As ownership figures revealed in Chapter II,
African-Americans tend to comprise the bulk of minority owners. Also, many of
the FCC policies regarding minority ownership grew from concerns voiced by
African-American individuals and groups. As a result, this study concentrated on
cases involving African-Americans.
There is an acknowledgment that some cases may involve AfricanAmerican women as well. That is an inherent outcome when deciding to narrow
cases by racial identification as opposed to gender identification. For purposes of
this study, black (African American) individuals and groups were the only minority
group used for analysis.
Judicial versus Administrative Cases

Statutes passed by Congress create federal administrative agencies. The
Federal Communications Commission is an example of what is called an
independent federal agency, meaning it was positioned by Congress to sit
outside the three branches of federal government. This "independence" is
guaranteed to some extent by the statute requiring no more than three of the five
FCC commissioners can be from the same political party. This independence,
however, is illusory because as is commonly observed, there often does not
seem to be major doctrinal differences between the two major political parties.
For example, in the late 1990s, FCC Chairman William Kennard wanted to draw
back from some of the deregulatory efforts within the industry, specifically
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ownership concentration, Congress (through pressure from the NAB) announced
it might hold hearings to investigate the role of the FCC. 303
Since its inception in 1934, the FCC has been more of an advocate for
broadcast licensees than a regulator. McChesney argued that the "FCC notion of
regulation owes more to its support of the commercial interest than to its being
the public watchdog." 304 The power to remove broadcast licenses was rarely
exercised and then usually for technical reasons (such as bad engineering or
straying from the assigned frequency). Even though it has been widely held that
licenses were renewed as a basic formality, former FCC Chairman Minow
remarked that there was nothing inherently permanent about a broadcast
license. 305 Broadcasters are now seen as "de facto owners," 306 as any challenges
to license holders because of inadequate service to the public are very difficult to
prove. McChesney noted that in 1998, the FCC failed to remove a license from a
Denver television station, despite evidence that showed no local public affairs
coverage and excessive coverage of violence in the news. 307
Nevertheless, the legal function remains-- independent agencies such as
the FCC are supposed to be insulated from political shifts or influences.
Regardless of whether the FCC is sufficiently independent to insure that
broadcasters live up to their obligations to serve the "public interest,
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convenience, or necessity," the FCC creates regulations, which are rules that
govern the areas they enforce.
Federal agency decisions constitute administrative law. Administrative
law, on a federal level, has the force of law. Rules, regulations, and decisions
from the FCC govern telecommunications throughout the country. However,
decisions from federal agencies are subject to review from the federal court
system. In the case of the FCC, any administrative decisions made can be
appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Several reasons preclude the use of FCC administrative decisions in this
study. First, the author seeks to understand the assumptions and arguments
used in judicial proceedings. Second, the judiciary makes what is called
"common law"- law that applies throughout the United States. More importantly, it
is such law that can overturn an administrative decision or rule an administrative
decision as unconstitutional. So while examining FCC decisions may have
added another dimension to this research, it is not necessary to the primary
focus of this study.
Ownership versus Employment Issues

Employment of minorities may be an entrance into minority ownership.
Nevertheless, most of the FCC employment rules and policies are based on the
EEOC guidelines and standards. The procedures and issues that are involved in
employment cases are different from procedures and issues in ownership cases.
Employment cases might involve such issues as sex, age, or religious
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discrimination. In order to keep the scope of the study narrowly focused on
minority ownership policies and regulations, employment cases were excluded
from analysis.
There were several limitations to this study that may have impacted the
outcome of this research. First, the texts for analysis were limited to federal court
cases, specifically district court and Supreme Court cases. While a search of
district court cases yielded no usable results, an inclusion of FCC decisions may
have provided an added dimension to this research. The addition of FCC rulings
and adjudications on the issues of minority ownership policies could show other
arguments that the agency considered which may have impacted the policies. In
addition, the rationales of the FCC's minority ownership policies could have been
weighed against their actions in other agency decisions. However, the focus of
this study was on judicial decisions and rationales used in their decision making
processes.
Another limitation of this policy was the focus on minority ownership
policies. While the study's topic was the reason why the cases were selected,
focusing on three distinct policies limited the number of potential cases. By
including perennial issues such as "sham" organizations, multiple ownership
rules, equal employment opportunities, and comparative license renewal
hearings, the impacts of other industry policies on minority participation could
have been examined.
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CHAPTER IV: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
In January of 1978, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) submitted a petition to the FCC calling for an official policy
statement on minority broadcast ownership. 308 Established in 1978 by
Reorganization Plan Number 1 (1977) and implemented with Executive order
12046, 309 the NTIA was created by President Jimmy Carter to shift
telecommunications policy and advisory functions away from the White House for
fear of undue Presidential influence. 310 The Executive Order made the Secretary
of Commerce the President's principal adviser on telecommunications policy. The
NTIA became the research unit for the United States government, formulating
policies to support the growth of telecommunications.

311

The NTIA wanted the

FCC to create a general policy in support of minority ownership and specific
polices that would: 1) create minority oriented changes to the comparative
hearing process, 2) create minority oriented changes in license assignment
policies, and 3) change standards of financial qualifications for new facilities
applicants. 312
While the NTIA had proposed specific items for implementation, the FCC
was already working on several of its own. By May of the same year, the FCC
formed the policies of granting tax certificates and distress sales to minority
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applicants. The rationale for the newly created policies was to increase
ownership by minorities and to "enhance the diversity of control of a limited
resource." Diversification was seen as a public interest goal, one that the FCC
wanted to promote. And while they noted that these two policies alone were not a
total solution to the problem, the FCC believed these policies would be a start.
Minority tax certificates, distress sales, and later on comparative hearings
would remain the primary ways that the FCC fostered minority ownership. What
follows is a discussion of how those policies have legislatively evolved over time.

MINORITY TAX CERTIFICATES
The FCC had been granting minority tax certificates since 1978. The
policy was effective in promoting minority ownership, thus it went relatively
unchanged for several years. These certificates provided a reduction in capital
gains taxes to owners of broadcast stations who sold their stations to minorityowned firms. In 1982, the FCC issued a policy statement that reflected some
modifications to the policy. 313 The FCC limited the usage of tax certificates to
situations that would only fulfill new or current FCC policy. That translated to the
barring of sales that involved detailed inquiry or required heightened evaluation
of the merits of the sales.
In 1986, the FCC chose to review the minority tax certificate policy along
with other minority-preference policies.314 However, Congress attached an
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appropriation rider to the FCC's fiscal budget which prohibited the spending of
monies to repeal, change, examine, or continue any examination of policies or
procedures that dealt with comparative licensing, distress sales, or tax
certificates. 315
The minority tax certificate policy would again come under scrutiny in
1995. Viacom Inc., one of the world's largest entertainment and media
companies, 316 announced that it was selling its cable systems to a minorityowned company on January 20, 1995. A minority tax certificate was being used
to complete the deal. There were many estimates on how much money Viacom
would defer from the sale. A Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress placed the figures anywhere from $440 million to $640 million
dollars. 317
It is important to note that linked together with the discussion of the
minority tax certificate was the government's plan to restore and codify a tax
deduction for self-employed people who paid certain portions of their health
premiums. In order to pay for the reinstatement of the tax deduction (revenue
reducer), the government had to find ways to fund it (revenue raisers). 318 One of
the ways to raise the revenue was the repeal of the tax certificate policy. It had
been estimated that by repealing the policy, federal revenue would increase by
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$1.3 million over a five-year period.319 While other measures were discussed, 320
the tax certificate was intensely focused on.
A bill that originated in the House of Representatives in February 1995,
H.R. 831, called for the end of the tax certificate. The bill was also applied
retroactively to January 17, 1995.321 That had serious implications for the Viacom
deal. In a Senate hearing, Viacom's Vice Executive President and General
Counsel Phillippe Dauman said:
"If I were unable to go through with this transaction we will
have to explore other possibilities. We had wished to reconfigure our assets ... That was the reason we explored
the sale of our cable system to Mr. Washington. But we will
not be able to go through with this sale if the Section 1071
program is retroactively repealed." 322

Both the House 323 and Senate 324 held public hearings on the minority tax
certificate program. Debate continued over the following months with the House
and Senate agreeing to the bill's passage. On April 11, 1995, House Bill 831,
which repealed the minority tax certificate and permanently extended the tax
deduction for health insurance costs of the self-employed, was signed into public
law.325

/d. at 3.
Modification of involuntary conversion rules and restrictions on earned income tax credits for low-income
workers.
321 H.R. 831.
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BROADCAST DISTRESS SALES
When the broadcast distress sale policy was adopted in 1978, the policy
sought to increase minority ownership. Station owners who were in danger of
losing a license could transfer the license at a "distressed" price (usually no more
than 75% of fair market value) to a minority owner. The minority ownership
interest in the property had to be more than fifty-percent or compose a controlling
interest.
Only forty broadcast licenses had been transferred using the broadcast
distress sale policy from 1978 until 1995. 326 So ttie FCC posted a notice of
inquiry to examine ways to expand the policy. 327 Specifically, the FCC wanted to
adopt two changes to the policy that would: 1) limit the distress price of the
station to no more than 50% of the fair market value, and 2) allow distress sales
prior to the beginning of revocation or renewal hearings. 328
However, the ruling in Shurberg v. FCC ended the Commission's attempts
to expand the policy. 329 In Shurberg, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled the policy
unconstitutional because it deprived Shurberg of his equal protection rights.
Furthermore, the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination and the policy was not designed to promote programming
diversity. 330 A rehearing en bane was denied. Consequently, the FCC
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terminated the original notice of inquiry begun in 1985 and the policy was
subsequently terminated. 331

COMPARATIVE LICENSE HEARINGS
The FCC has used comparative hearings for the awarding of radio and
television licenses for many years. However in 1965, the Commission announced
a set of guidelines and preferences to be followed in future comparative
hearings.

332

In a comparative hearing, each applicant presents evidence and

reasons as to why it should be awarded the license being sought by multiple
applicants. However, the comparative hearing process did not initially have
provisions that specifically focused on race. The main goals of the comparative
policy were: 1) to provide the best service to the public and 2) to provide a
maximum diffusion of control of mass media. According to the Commission, good
service originated from a broadcaster's ability to serve his or her primary
audience needs and be aware of other specialized needs or interests.
Diversification of control was needed in a free society, especially in a system
where the government must limit access to, and control of, broadcast licenses.
However, diversification of control in the 1965 policy statement did not
speak of granting preferences based on racial orientation. In fact, most of the
issues under the diversification criterion dealt with manageme~t. The
Commission favored full-time owners, as it believed hands-on participation would
lead to greater knowledge of the community. Experience within the industry, local
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residence, participation in community activities, and types of signal coverage
were other types of factors under the diversification criterion.
Granting Minority Preference in Comparative Hearings
The granting of racial and gender preferences were born out of the
decisions in two D.C. Circuit cases. In TV 9, 333 several applicants filed for the
license of a Florida TV station. The station was awarded to a company called
Mid-Florida. Appellants contested the FCC's award of the station to Mid-Florida.
Specifically, a minority owned company called Comint claimed no credit was
given in the proceedings to its ownership structure. Two of the principals in
Comint Corporation were African-American. In addition, one of the AfricanAmerican principals was designated a vice president and was to spend at least
two days a week at the TV station. Both African-American principals had lived in
the community for more than 20 years, and had been involved in various
community activities.
The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that the level of participation by the
two African-American principals would be high. However, the FCC did not grant
credit to Comint. The FCC ruled that the Communications Act was color-blind
and unless Com int could show that the participation of the two minority principals
would provide a level of superior service than Mid-South, Comint could not
succeed on minority ownership merit. Black ownership could not be an
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independent comparative factor. Instead, black ownership must be shown to
produce a public interest benefit.
The D.C. Circuit Court found the FCC's decision to be inadequate. While
the Commission granted some credit to Comint for management participation,
the court stated that was not the same kind of credit that could have been
attributed to the broader community representation of the two principals. The
credit being sought by Comint was consistent with the comparative hearings
criterion of "diversification of ownership of mass media." Moreover, the court
argued that the FCC wavered on its own standards of qualifications, as the FCC
sought an assurance of superior community service from Comint, but did not
seek such assurance on the issues of local residence, participation or integration
of management with ownership.
In Garrett v. FCC, 334 the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC did not
provide credit for black ownership and operation of a radio station in Alabama. In
addition, the Court contended that the FCC did not remain faithful to prior
precedents it had set with other cases with similar circumstances. The proposals
of Garrett and the other applicant were combined into a comparative hearing at
the request of an administrative law judge, since the targeted changes of both
stations would have impacted service to the Huntsville, Alabama area. The
appellant, Leroy Garrett, had filed an application with the FCC seeking to
construct additional facilities that would change his station's (WEUP) status from

334

Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (1975).

81

daytime-only to unlimited broadcasting. The Commission denied his application
because Garrett was unable to comply with rules regarding minimum city
coverage. The competing applicant also fell short on coverage requirements, but
the application was granted. The FCC and an administrative law judge believed
that the competing applicant's lack of coverage was better justified.
The competing applicant's proposed changes would have encompassed
92.4% of the population and 89.4% of the area of the city of Warner Robins,
Georgia which is about 200 miles away from Huntsville. In contrast, the
administrative law judge stated Garrett's proposal would have included only
73.4% of Huntsville's total population and 49% of its total area. However,
Garrett's proposed changes would have provided service to more than 12,000
people without AM service and would have attracted over 100,000 more people
through the nighttime service. The FCC considered the competing applicant's
transmitter site as providing optimum coverage of the city and a waiver of the
coverage rules was granted. Neither the Review Board nor the FCC considered
Garrett's proposal impressive enough to grant a waiver.
The Court of Appeals called the judgment of the Review Board "grievously
incorrect." Citing its motivations in the TV 9 decision, the Court held that in
situations where minority ownership is inclined to increase or produce diversity,
merit should be awarded in those situations. The Court insisted that reasonable
expectation of the diversity is necessary as a basis for credit, however an
advance demonstration of diversity was not needed.
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Revamping Minority Preference in Comparative Hearings

In 1992, the Commission wanted to fully reexamine the comparative
hearing policy. 335 Although the Commission had previously tried to create new
procedures that would speed up the comparative process, 336 attempts were
deferred due to several petitions for reconsideration. 337 In order to revamp the
1965 policy, the FCC sought comments on modifications to several criteria: 1)
integration of ownership and management, 2) proposed program service, 3) past
broadcast record, and 4) use of auxiliary power. 338 The FCC also wanted
additional comments on its proposal for a new, point-based system of evaluating
competing applicants.
After a deadline extension, 339 the FCC issued another Notice of Proposed
Rule Making for consideration of an amendment to the comparative hearing
policy. The Amendment suggested that successful applicants own their stations
for a minimum of three years before transferring ownership. 340 As the comment
period for the notice was extended, 341 the United States Court of Appeals for the
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District of Columbia reviewed the case of Bechtel v. FCC. 342 This case was to
become a crucial moment in the ongoing FCC discussions about comparative
hearings.
Demise of Minority Preference and Comparative Hearings
In deciding between or among mutually exclusive applicants who wanted
to build and operate a new broadcasting station, the FCC generally favored
applicants who promised to participate consistently in the station's management.
In Bechtel v. FCC [Bechtel /],343 an application was denied due to the lack of
integration of management. Because there was no proposal to integrate
ownership and management of the new station, an administrative law judge
rejected several competing applications, including Bechtel's. On an appeal by
Bechtel, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled the Commission had to demonstrate
why integration of ownership was in the public interest. The Court further
instructed the FCC to respond to Bechtel's challenges and consider the
application in light of those challenges.
As the Court was deciding the Bechtel I case, the FCC ceased
comparative hearings, halted the intake of new applications, and stopped
judgment on any outstanding mutually exclusive proposals. 344 Upon remand in
Bechtel I, the FCC failed to show why integration was still in the public interest.
Soon afterwards, Bechtel again took the case to the D.C. Court of Appeals
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[Bechtel

in.

345

This time the court decided that integration of ownership was a

subjective and unreliable criterion and was deemed unlawful. 346 The Court
ordered the FCC to hold new proceedings to consider Bechtel's application
without the integration preference.
The FCC decided not to appeal the Bechtel II decision and subsequently
lifted some of the restrictions placed during the comparative hearing freeze. 347 A
second further notice of proposed rule making was issued. 348 This time, the FCC
was looking for comments and suggestions that would help fine tune the policy in
349 But before any results could be seen
light of the final decision in Bechtel 11.

from the FCC's proposed rule making on comparative hearings, an act of
Congress would dramatically alter the future of comparative hearings altogether.

Competitive Bidding Replaces Comparative Hearings
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted on February 8,
1996. 350 Section 3090) of the Telecommunications Act reads as follows:
U) Use of competitive bidding.

(1) General authority. If, consistent with the obligations
described in paragraph (6)(E}, mutually exclusive
applications are accepted for any initial license or
construction permit, then, except as provided in paragraph
(2), the Commission shall grant the license or permit to a
qualified applicant through a system of competitive bidding
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that meets the requirements of this subsection.
(5) Bidder and licensee qualification. No person shall be
permitted to participate in a system of competitive bidding
pursuant to this subsection unless such bidder submits
such information and assurances as the Commission may
require to demonstrate that such bidder's application is
acceptable for filing. No license shall be granted to an
applicant selected pursuant to this subsection unless the
Commission determines that the applicant is qualified
pursuant to subsection (a) and sections 308(b) and 310
[47 uses§§308(b) and 310]. Consistent with the
objectives described in paragraph (3), the Commission
shall, by regulation, prescribe expedited procedures
consistent with the procedures authorized by subsection
(i)(2) for the resolution of any substantial and material
issues of fact concerning qualifications.
(11) Termination. The authority of the Commission to
grant a license or permit under this subsection shall expire
September 30, 2007.

The 1997 Balanced Budget Act further expanded the Commission's
authority under section 309G) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to resolve
all mutually exclusive license applicants by competitive bidding procedures. 351 In
November of that same year, the FCC proposed license auction procedures. 352
Almost a year after the Balanced Budget Act allowed the FCC to resolve
competing applications through competitive bidding, the Commission adopted
general bidding procedures to select among mutually exclusive broadcast license
applications. 353
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Advancing Minority Ownership

Although policies were created to enhance minority ownership, there
continued to be a real problem incorporating minorities into broadcast ownership.
To address the problem, the FCC formed the Advisory Committee on Alternative
Financing for Minority Opportunities in Telecommunications.

354

The FCC

discussed its continual efforts in the area of minority broadcast ownership and
included recommendations from the Advisory Committee. 355 Based upon several
of those recommendations, the FCC adopted new procedures which included: 1)
authorized tax certificates and distress sales to limited partnerships when a
minority general partner owned at least twenty percent of the property, 2) allowed
tax certificates to divesting shareholders only when that divestiture further
promoted minority ownership, and 3) delegated authority to conducted distress
sale transactions to the Mass Media Bureau for quicker expedition. 356
In addition to the policy statement, the Commission also issued a notice of
proposed rule making to investigate the expansion of seller-creditor rights. 357 The
FCC acknowledged that some sellers and creditors might take a security interest
in a station's assets or stock in the corporate license and that such transfers
could be further promoted if sellers had greater protection. That protection, the
FCC proposed, might come in the form of a reversionary interest, a future
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interest in a broadcast property when the property is not completely disposed of,
yet assigned or granted to, another party.
Supporters of expanding seller-creditor rights felt the physical assets of a
station represent a small portion of the station's actual value and if sellers have
to place a high reliance on those assets that places their capital at greater risk.358
And although supporters of the expansion of seller-creditor rights indicated such
expansion would stimulate minority acquisition, the FCC did not agree. 359
The FCC, along with various comments from minority and communitybased groups, noted there have never been any property rights in a broadcast
license. As such, licenses could not be subject to reversionary interest. The
Commission also expressed concern expressed by commissioners that the
proposed policy would hinder the progress of minority owners. Their
independence as broadcasters would be threatened as control over their
broadcast facility might be compromised. Noting the above arguments, the FCC
terminated the proceeding into the expansion of seller-creditor rights. 360

REEXAMINING OWNERSHIP POLICIES
By the middle of the 1980s, the broadcasting industry had changed. The
industry was beginning to undergo deregulation. The Supreme Court had begun
to review many affirmative action cases with more scrutiny. 361 Its review of such
cases had bearing on the FCC's race preferential programs. So the Commission
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issued a notice of inquiry to reexamine the comparative licensing process, the
distress sale policy, and the minority tax certificate program. 362
The inquiry was designed to examine the constitutionality of the programs
against the "strict scrutiny" standard of review. Additionally, the inquiry solicited
comments and evidence as to the connection between minority/gender
ownership and programming. The FCC noted in its inquiry the provisions
Congress had made in the Communications Act of 1982.363 Section 309 of the
Communications Act of 1982 codified the lottery licensing provision, which
authorized a minority preference plan. Notwithstanding Congress' attempts to
promote and protect minority ownership, the FCC solicited comments on how to
reconcile the government's attempts to promote minority ownership with the
judiciary's strict review of such policies.
Besides seeking comments on the legal arguments surrounding these
policies, the FCC postponed consideration of all distress sales and comparative
hearings where the diversification criterion was being claimed. However,
President Reagan signed into law a joint resolution from the House of
Representatives on December 22, 1987. 364 This resolution, which authorized
monies for the fiscal year 1988, attached an appropriation rider to the FCC's
fiscal allocations. The rider prohibited the FCC from spending any of the monies
to repeal, change, examine, or continue any examination of policies or
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procedures that dealt with comparative licensing, distress sales, or tax
certificates. That law effectively terminated the FCC's efforts to re-examine those
policies and the FCC issued an order stating their discontinuation of their
proceedings in January of 1988.365 To ensure the FCC did not attempt to change
these policies in the future, the same rider was attached to every fiscal budget
until 1994. 366 Congress intended, through its actions, to keep minority ownership
policies intact.
Nearly eight years later, the FCC would finally get the opportunity to reexamine the minority ownership policies. In a 1995 notice of proposed rule
making, the Commission wanted to look at alternative legal remedies for
providing entry for minority ownership. 367 The Commission wanted remarks on its
exploratory proposals for an incubator program (to provide minority and female
broadcast owners with small interest loans and other services from large
broadcast groups), on FCC's revision to the broadcast ownership form to include
information on race and gender, and on ways to expand the tax certificate
program to encourage more sales to minorities. 368
After an order for extending the comment period was granted, 369 the
Commission issued a report and order in 1998.370 One of the results from the

365

Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies
Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, F.C.C.R. 766 (1988).
366 See, Pub. L. No. 100-459 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-162 (1989); Pub. L. No. 101-515 (1990); Pub. L. No.
102- 140 (1991); Pub. L. No 102-395 (1992); Pub. L. No. 103-121 (1993); Pub. L. No. 103-317 (1994).
367 Policies And Rules Regarding Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R.
2788 (1995) (proposed January 12, 1995).
368 Id. at 2790-2792.
369 Review Of The Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite
Stations, Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media, Facilities, Attribution Of Broadcast interests,
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report was the modification of the annual ownership form to require information
on race and gender of the license holder(s), excluding those ownership
structures that are not required to file such forms (e.g. sole owners and
partnerships).

371

Petitions were filed shortly after the adoption of the revisions to

the annual ownership form. Petitioners, the National Association of Broadcasters
[NAB], stated the new form would create more paperwork and would be an
undue burden. In addition, the NAB stated that the NTIA already collected such
information and the FCC's efforts would be redundant.
The FCC, in addressing the comments, declined to remove the new
revisions. 372 Although it acknowledged that the NTIA collected similar
information, the Commission noted the NTIA's collection of such data was not
altogether complete. Also, the NTIA reports did not distinguish owners on the
basis of gender, as the FCC annual report form would. Last, the FCC's collection
of data was premised on legal, statutory authority, since the Commission
provides licenses to broadcasters.

SUMMARY
The legislative histories of minority ownership policies serve as a
backdrop to legal discourse and analysis. While the histories may show some

Investment In The Broadcast Industry, Cross-Interest Policy, 10 F.C.C.R. 12277 (1995).
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -- Streamlining Of Mass Media Applications, Rules, And Processes,
Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media Facilities, 13 F.C.C.R. 23056
(1998).
~11 Id.
372 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Streamlining Of Mass Media Applications, Rules, And Processes,
Policies And Rules Regarding Minority And Female Ownership Of Mass Media Facilities, 14 F.C.C.C.R.
17525 (1999).

370
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inconsistencies, they do show long-standing discussion, usage, and support of
minority ownership policies by the FCC and Congress. The policy that had the
steadiest support, with the least challenge, was the minority tax certificate.
However that policy, along with broadcast distress sales, was eventually
repealed. The only policy left standing was comparative hearings, which
underwent a transformation with the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
The legislative histories of these policies are used during judicial decisions
about minority ownership. While circuit judges and Supreme Court justices would
eventually dispute the meaning and weight of legislative histories on case law,
the histories do provide a good sense of the rationale behind the policies.
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CHAPTER V: FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
As described in Chapter 111,
Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases were
used to gather court cases concerning minority ownership policy. A thorough
search using the terms outlined in Chapter Ill yielded twenty-five cases.
Seventeen cases were eliminated, as the questions posed in the cases did not
turn on the specific issue of minority ownership or any of the minority ownership
policies. 373
Eight cases were classified as texts for analysis. Of those eight, only one
was decided at the Supreme Court level. The other seven cases were decided in
the D.C. Circuit Court. The cases span the period from 1973 through 1990. What
follows next is an overview of each case, which includes posture, questions
before the court, and the decision. Chapter VI provides a full analysis of court
rationales in each case and discusses those rationales in light of social and
political contexts.

TV 9, INC. V. FCC (1973)374
In 1965, Mid-Florida TV, TV 9 Inc., and other applicants 375 were
competing for a permit to operate a TV station in Orlando, Florida. While the

373 For example, one case dealt with minority preferences in personal communication services (PCS)
auctions; another case dealt with FCC multiple ownership rules, with impacts on minority ownership as a
secondary result. Other cases discussed changes in the board of director's, legal representation, denial of
licenses, "sham" organizations, or other topics that were not a direct result from the question of minority
ownership preferences or policies.
374 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
375 The other applicants were Orange Nine, Central Nine Corp., Howard A. Weiss, Florida Heartland, Comint
Corp., and Florida 9 Broadcasting Co.
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FCC denied the applications of several applicants, it allowed Mid-Florida interim
authority of the television channel. Comint (a minority- owned company) and
Consolidated Nine 376 applied for interim authority of the channel, but their
applications were denied. Both parties appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. The
court vacated the grant of interim authority to Mid-Florida and remanded the case
back to the FCC. The Commission then granted interim authority to Consolidated
Nine in 1969.
A comparative hearing ensued among TV 9, Inc., Comint, Central Nine,
Florida Heartland, and Mid-Florida. In 1972, the Commission awarded MidFlorida's application for a new TV station to operate in Orlando. The award went
to Mid-Florida based on what the FCC called the "best practicable service"
through its superior integration of ownership with management and their good
past broadcast record. The case was then brought as another appeal to the D.C.
Circuit Court.
The question presented in this case was whether merit for black
participation and black ownership should be awarded during the comparative
hearing process? The court answered by stating only when minority ownership is
likely to increase diversity of content, especially of opinion and viewpoint, should
merit be awarded. The holding in this case was significant in that it stated when
minorities proposed to be instrumental in local management and ownership of
stations, merit should be awarded during the comparative hearing process.

376

Consolidated Nine was composed of three of the initial applicants: Central Nine, TV 9, and Florida
Heartland). Consolidation Nine was formed for the express purpose of trying to gain interim authority of the
channel.
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GARRETT V. FCC (1975)377
Appellant (Garrett) was denied an application seeking to construct
facilities that would change his station from daytime only to unlimited
broadcasting. Garrett's station, WEUP, located in Huntsville, Alabama, was also
in competition with the application of WRBN, Warner Robbins, Georgia, to
upgrade facilities. The FCC consolidated the two applications and assigned them
for comparative hearings. The FCC determined that WEUP's proposed change of
service would not meet coverage rules and was therefore denied. WRBN's
proposed changes, although falling short on the coverage requirements, were
enough to justify the rule waiver. Garrett app·ealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit
Court.
This case presented several questions. First, did the Commission, in
denying Garrett the application, give proper weight to the black ownership and
operation of Garrett's station? In addition, were the rulings on station coverage in
error? The Court of Appeals ruled the Commission erred when it denied Garrett's
application and in its application of the waiver provision. The court cited prior
federal cases where it held that administrative bodies cannot act in an arbitrary

377

513 F.2d 1056 {D.C. Cir 1975).
The D.C. Circuit Court noted that prior FCC cases should have been used as precedent for the coverage
issue. In Great Southern Broadcasting Company, 7 F.C.C.2d 701 (1968), the Commission allowed an AM
station to be built in a small, unincorporated community in Tennessee. As the community had merged with a
larger city, the Commission stated the new municipality was large, covered rural and urban areas. As such,
the FCC continued to acknowledge the former town and city before the merger took place. In KDEF, 30
F.C.C. 635 (1961), a daytime only station in New Mexico was authorized to broadcast without limit even
though the coverage did not conform to minimum filed intensity rules. The coverage extended to fewer than
70% of the city limits within Albuquerque. Because a large part of the underserved areas were in fact under
populated, the Commission decided that it would have been too harsh to require an applicant to require
service to vacant areas near the city.
378
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manner and cannot treat similar situations differently. 378 Although it was stated
that the cases were different, there was no adequate explanation as to why the
two applications were so different as to warrant different treatment.
It was also noted that WEUP, as a solely black-owned and operated
facility, was primarily black-staffed and was one of a few such stations
nationwide at the time. Huntsville, the city of service, had a considerable black
population that WEUP claimed to serve. The black ownership and operation of
WEUP did not receive any qualitative credit during the proceedings. The court,
as it referred to its supplemental opinion in the TV 9 case, wrote that in light of
TV 9 the FCC erred in its decision not to grant merit to Garrett. 379 In that

supplemental opinion, merit was defined as recognition by the FCC that a
particular applicant has positive qualities that may (but do not always) result in a
preference. The thrust of TV 9 was relevant to this case, which the FCC did not
acknowledge. The Court remanded the case back to the FCC to re-examine the
applicability of coverage rules and its waiver rules in light of past precedents and
TV9.

This case was significant in that the court not only affirmed its earlier
holding in TV 9, but also extended merit for minority ownership and participation
in comparative hearings to other situations.

379

495 F .2d 929

at 941 .
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STEREO BROADCASTERS 1 INC. V. FCC (1981) 380
Stereo Broadcasters, located in Garden City, New York, was selling its
properties through a distress sale to Domino Broadcasting Company (a minority
entity). Stereo Broadcasting opted to pursue the sale, despite the fact that its
application for renewal had progressed to an unfavorable decision by an
administrative law judge.
As noted in the D.C. Circuit opinion, the original policy on station transfers
was limited to license holders who had been designated for a revocation hearing
or whose renewal application had been assigned to a hearing. 381 The distress
sale policy was allowed in cases where the licensee had moved into the initial
decision stage of application or renewal. 382 The minority distress sale policy had
three major components: promotion of minority ownership, deterrence, and
administrative economy. 383 The two concepts in question are the deterrence and
administrative economy. Stereo claimed that substantial financial gains could still
take place if the sale between Domino and Stereo was allowed to go through.
Citing the costs of appealing a negative decision and subsequent costs of
holding comparative hearings to fill the vacancy if Stereo was disqualified, it
would provide better administrative economy to allow Stereo to consummate the

380

Stereo Broadcasters Inc, v. Federal Communications Commission, 652 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1027.
382 Id. at 1027- 1028. As stated in the opinion of the court, the FCC had initially limited the distress sale to
cases in which hearings had not yet begun. This eliminate potential abuses by a rogue licensee who would
go through a hearing, seeing what evidence could be presented against him, then decide to sell to a minority
in order to gain some kind of monetary value out of a licensee that would well be denied. However, the
Commission broadened the policy to cases that were in transition, meaning the case had gone to a hearing
but no ruling had been issued.
383 Id. at 1029. Minority ownership was not in question because it was clearly established that a black
minority controlled Domino Broadcasting Company.
381
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sale. As for deterrence, Stereo argued that it was unreasonable to discriminate
among licensees in the hearing process until a final determination of the
questions had been reached.
Despite Stereo's arguments, the FCC did not allow the distress sale.
Stereo Broadcasters claimed the FCC's application of the various factors of the
distress sale policy (as it pertained to their case) was arbitrary and capricious
and an abuse of the FCC's discretion. They appealed the decision to the D.C.
Circuit Court.
Was the FCC's application of the various factors of the minority distress
sale policy arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the FCC's discretion? The court
held that the FCC, in using its agency discretion, did not act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. The FCC did not take well to a license holder, already
considered unfit to retain a license, seeking to gain profit from a station that
he/she was no longer deemed to have a right to operate. This case showed that
the structure of the distress sale policy and the administration of the policy were
upheld by the court.

WEST MICHIGAN BROADCASTING V. FCC (1984) 384
Waters Broadcasting (a minority entity) and West Michigan Broadcasting
filed mutually exclusive applications for construction permits to build a new FM
radio station in Hart, Michigan. An administrative law judge granted the license to
Waters because of the credits received for being black owned, for local

384

West Michigan Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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residence, and for civic activities. 385 Upon appeal to the FCC's Review Board, the
decision was reversed. Waters then appealed to the full Commission, which
reversed and granted Waters the license.
West Michigan appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. Its challenge was
against the FCC's use of the minority enhancements in comparative hearings, as
well as the enhancement given to Waters for local residency and community
involvement. Because the community to be served had a sparse black
population, West Michigan argued the FCC was wrong to grant any minority
enhancements.
In this case, the court had to decide if the FCC usage of minority
enhancements in comparative hearings was a violation of equal protection and a
violation of specific comparative hearing criteria. The court ruled that the FCC's
use of the minority enhancement did not violate any administrative, statutory, or
constitutional (equal protection) laws. The court referred to the holding in TV 9
and stated that the ruling in TV 9 supported the FCC's granting of the license to
Waters. The FCC sought to provide minority ownership regardless of the size of
or existence of a minority population in the community of license.
Prior Supreme Court cases Bakke

386

and Ful/ilove 387 were cited as

precedents that established FCC minority enhancements would not violate equal

385

Id. at 602.
438 U.S. 265. This was a highly charged case, as noted by the opinions of the court. Writing the court's
opinion was Justice Powell in which Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in part and
dissented in part. In addition, Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed separate opinions. Justice
Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justices Burger, Stewart,
and Rehnquist joined in Steven's dissent.
387 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a
386
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protection. In order to understand the applicability of these cases to FCC minority
preferences, the Supreme Court's decision in both of cases must be explained.
In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down a university admission policy that set
aside a fixed percentage for minority students in a state medical school's
entering class. Justice Powell's opinion rejected the idea that race classifications
could be used to assure a diverse student body. 388
The majority opinion also rejected race classifications as a remedy for
past discrimination. The university had not made a final conclusion that
discrimination did in fact exist or such discrimination warranted special
classification and admission for minority groups. Yet, the opinion did recognize
that the university had a compelling interest to promote a diverse educational
experience. To that end, the court suggested that had the preference been a part
of a multi-factor decision process, it might have passed judicial review. 389
However, race alone could not be the basis for special classification.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated in Fullilove that while
programs that used race classifications need to be closely examined, when
"benign" race classifications were used--adopted by an administrative agency at
the direction of congressional action--the courts were bound to defer to
Congress. 390 As such, the majority did not apply strict scrutiny review to the

government sponsored minority preference for a set aside provision authorizing funding in public works
construction.
388 438 U.S. 265 at 307.
389 438 U.S. 265 at 317.
390 448 U.S. 448 at 502- 507. Congress is charged by Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to look after and
ensure the general welfare of society. The Court held that even if the measures were not necessarily
remedial, they could be allowed under the Constitution so long as the preference served an important
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questioned racial preference. In light of the decisions and rationales used in
Bakke and Fullilove, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled the FCC policy of granting
enhancements was constitutionally valid.
In contrast to Bakke, the FCC did not set up quotas the number of
licenses to be given to minorities. The enhancement was part of a multi-factor
approach. Second, in agreement with Fullilove, congressional action had shown
recognition of the underrepresentation of minorities in mass media ownership.
That underrepresentation was attributed to past racial and ethnic discrimination.
This case further solidified the use of FCC minority ownership preference policies
as constitutionally valid and serving as a compelling government objective.

NATIONAL BLACK MEDIA COALITION V. FCC (1987) 391
The FCC observed that daytime AM stations were providing good service
to their communities despite their technical limitations. So the Commission
issued an order allowing such stations to expand their operating hours as far as
the.station could technically handle.392 However, in 1981 the NTIA petitioned for
rulemaking proceedings that would give daytimers preference in comparative
hearings for new FM facilities. 393 While the FCC deferred decision on that issue,
it pursued other avenues to increase the number of commercial FM stations. As it
issued a notice of proposed rule making, the FCC sought comment on whether to
grant special consideration for daytimers over other competing applicants for new

iovernmental objective.
1 822 F.2d 277 (1987).
392 Id. at 278.
393 Id.
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FM stations in the same community. 394 As the rules stood, competing applicants
for a FM station could "win" through the diversification of mass media property
preference over daytime stations.
The National Black Media Coalition submitted comments that opposed
granting special consideration to daytime AM stations. Instead, the Coalition
wanted the FCC to reduce the demerits it assigned to local broadcasters who
sought additional licenses during the comparative process. In spite of this, most
comments were in favor of the FCC's plan.
In 1985, the FCC released its second report and order and concluded the
relief for daytime AM stations was appropriate. 395 Several criteria were outlined
for the enhancement preference. 396 Overall the enhancement consisted of
upgrading the value of previous broadcast experience as an "integration
enhancement". Prior broadcast experience would have the same weight that
was given for the enhancement factors of minority ownership and local
residence.
Petitions were filed for reconsideration of the order. Most petitioners
agreed that daytime stations should be given preferences, but the degree of
preference should be greater. However, The National Black Media Coalition

Id. at 279.
101 F.C.C. 2d 638 (1985).
396 822 F.2d 277 at 280. The enhancements were conditioned upon: 1) broadcast experience based on prior
participation in management of daytime station, 2) daytime station must be in same city as proposed FM
station, 3)daytime station must have been in operation for three continuous years, 4) owner proposed to
become integrated in management of FM station, 5) owner must divest of the daytime station in three years.
394
395
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petitioned for elimination or weakening the preference. The FCC rejected all
petitions and allowed the order to stand.
The Coalition petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit Court (D.C. Cir.)
and asked for invalidation or remand of the rule for further proceedings,
especially with respect to the concerns of the Coalition. The Coalition was
extremely concerned as to whether the new enhancement given to daytime
stations: 1) reduced the number of minority owned companies that could
compete for new FM license, 2) represented a departure from FCC policy of
encouraging minority ownership, and 3) eliminated other alternative proposals. 397
The court agreed with the Commission and allowed the ruling to stand. It
concluded that the FCC had adequately stated its rationale for the enhancement,
noting that good service under the "technically different" daytimer status would
lead to reasonable conclusion of good service on the FM band. While the
Coalition stated the rule would reduce the opportunities for minorities to own
broadcast stations, the Court wrote the FCC properly weighed and balanced the
issues of daytimer stations and minority ownership. 398 Providing a criterion that
called for divestiture of the daytimer station within three years was crucial to the
Court, as it showed the Commission had struck a balance between minority
ownership concerns and the goal of incorporating daytime station ownership. 399
The divestiture was said by the FCC to create more daytimer stations, which
would offset any negative impacts of the move to FM.

822 F. 2d 277 at 280.
/d. at 281.
399 Id. at 282.
397

398
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SHURBERG BROADCASTING OF HARTFORD V. FCC (1989)4°0
Faith Center, a television station licensed in Hartford, Connecticut,
attempted to sell its station through a minority distress sane. Faith Center tried
twice unsuccessfully to complete such a sale. After its second attempt, Shurberg
sought to file a permit to construct a station. That application was exclusive of
Faith Center's renewal application. The FCC could have 1) granted Faith Center
a third attempt to sell its property to Astroline (a minority entity) or 2) granted
Shurberg's request for comparative consideration. The FCC decided to allow
Faith Center another chance to sell its station. Shurberg appealed the decision.
However, other events took place soon after that would halt the appeals
process. First, the decision in Steele v. FCC 401 had the FCC wondering if the
distress sale policy was still constitutional. The ruling in that case stated the FCC
acted beyond its statutory authority when it extended ownership preferences to
female applicants during comparative hearings. While the judges in the case
acknowledged the merit and clear congressional endorsement of minority
preferences, there was no such documentation pertaining to female
ownership. 402 As the FCC sought to undergo examination of minority and gender
preferences in media ownership, congressional appropriation riders prohibited
any inquires the FCC might have made. The Commission re-instated the distress

400

876 F.2d 902 (1989).
Supra note 10. Steele v. FCC dealt specifically with enhancements for women and gender discrimination.
This case was excluded for analysis as based upon the criteria outlined in Chapter Ill.
402 Donald Gillmor, et. al, Mass Communications Law: Cases and Comments 720-721 (5th ed., 1990).
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sale policy, thereby allowing Faith Center to pursue the sale with Astroline.
Consequently, Shurberg's appeal was re-instated.
Did the FCC's minority distress sale policy violate the equal protection
rights of Shurberg, as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment? The FCC had
previously ruled the policy to be constitutionally sound because the Commission
contended that underrepresentation of minorities in ownership and programming
would be corrected if there was an increase in minority ownership." 403 The
Commission also looked to congressional action when in 1982, the
Communications Act was amended to include minority preferences in the
broadcast license lottery policy.404 According to the per curiam opinion of the
D.C. Circuit, the distress sale policy violated Shurberg's rights because the
program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination or to promote
programming diversity. 405 The court relied on the opinions of Bakke, Fullilove,
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 406 and Croson v. City of Richmond

407

as

the basis for their decision.
In Croson, it was held that race seldom provided a basis for disparate
treatment and that race classifications were potentially harmful to society. The
city had developed a minority business utilization plan, which called for the major
city contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of a contract's dollar amount
to one or more minority businesses. The plan, according to the high court, used

403
404
405

406
407

Id. at 906.
Id.
876 F .2d 902 at 918.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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racial quotas. State and local government had no mandate to enforce the 14th
amendment. As such, race classifications ought to be clearly identified and
unquestionably legitimate. The Supreme Court ruled that the city of Richmond
had violated the equal protection clause. In Wygant, a school board policy
provided minority teachers a preference over non-minority teachers with seniority
during school layoffs. The Supreme Court ruled that policy unconstitutional. By
providing a preference to minority teachers over non-minority teachers with
seniority, the school board failed to establish the necessary evidence of past
discrimination for remedial action. Due to the lack of evidence that tied past
discrimination to the remedial action, the court stated the policy was not narrowly
tailored to achieve its purpose.
From those four cases, the opinion in Shurberg generalized that
government imposed minority preferences are constitutional under certain
circumstances. Yet such a preference could not be prefaced on the desire to
achieve some level of diversity with an institution. 408 The circuit court noted that
besides remedying past discrimination, the only other rationale supported by the
Supreme Court was the promotion of a diverse student body. 409 Quoting Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, the D.C. court said the "goal of racial diversity might
be compelling only when the greater diversity itself serves one of society's
fundamental goals. 410 However, the court [Shurberg] asserted that neither
Congress nor the FCC found evidence that linked the underrepresentation of

408
409
410

Id. at 912.
This position was stated in Bakke; however the minority preference in this case was invalidated.
876 F.2d 902 at 913.
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minorities to any discrimination by the FCC or the broadcast industry. 411
Underrepresentation alone was not appreciable proof of past discrimination. 412
Outside of the representation issue, the preference given to minorities
through distress sales was not tied to any disadvantage. The policy unfairly
burdened third parties because their race eliminated them from potentially
gaining a broadcast property. According to Judge Silberman, neither Congress
nor the FCC linked underrepresentation to past discrimination by the FCC or the
broadcasting industry. 413
Agreeing with Silberman's analysis, Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon
wrote the FCC's program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. In
fact, the program was labeled "untailored" because its open-endness allowed it to
be applied to any license without regard to any past discrimination. 414 Since the
offense of the licensee was in no way connected to past discrimination, the policy
violated the holding in Croson. However Judge Wald viewed West Michigan as
binding precedent. 415 The opinion in West Michigan pointed to several occasions
where Congress had supported the FCC's attempts to diversify media control
through minority ownership (e.g., Congress' institution of license lottery
preferences for minorities, appropriations riders, etc.) Since Congress supported
the policy, the outcome of Croson had little relevance to the current dispute.

411
412
413
414
415

Id. at 914.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 930.
876 F.2d 902 at 935.
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Judge Wald also argued that efforts to promote diversity were a basis to
remedy past discrimination. 416 Therefore, the distress policy was not a set-aside
as there was no pre-determined number of stations. The dismal figures that
reflected underrepresentation of minorities emphasized why policies that
encouraged general diversity had failed. The underrepresentation of minorities in
the industry, coupled with the lack of diversity in programming was the direct
result of past racial discrimination. 417 By implementing the distress sale policy on
the basis of viewpoint diversity through minority ownership, the Commission
designed the policy as a way to deal with the disproportion number of minorities
in the broadcasting industry. 418 Furthermore, Judge Wald asserted the
"distress sale policy rest on an assumption that views and
listeners of every race will benefit from access to a broader
range of broadcastfare... ,"419

WINTER PARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. FCC (1989) 420
These were the consolidated cases of Metro Broadcasting and Winter
Park. Appellants sought review of a FCC order to grant a broadcast license to
Rainbow Broadcasting (a minority entity). Following a 1982 rule making
proceeding, the FCC assigned a new TV station to the city of Orlando.
Commission rules dictated a fifteen-mile rule, so channels were to be used in
communities located within fifteen miles of Orlando. Metro Broadcasting, Winter

416
417
418
419

420

Id. at 942.
Id. at941.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 942.
873 F.2D 347 (1989).
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Park, and Rainbow filed mutually exclusive applications for the channel. Metro
and Winter Park stated Orlando was their place of license, but Winter Park
claimed a close city of Winter Park as the city of license. However all three stated
they were serving the entire Orlando area.
An administrative law judge issued the license to Metro, as Metro's
qualitative factors suggested that it would be a better applicant than Winter Park.
Rainbow was disqualified for lack of candor on its application. Winter and
Rainbow appealed to the FCC's Review Board. The Review Board reversed the
lack of candor decision against Rainbow and awarded Rainbow the station. The
Review Board also decided that Winter Park was not entitled to extra credit under
section 307 of the Communications Act. 421 (The credit sought was under section
307(b) of the Communications Act for providing first local TV service to the
Winter Park area.) However, the Board reduced the integration credit of Metro
and found Rainbow had a quantitative and qualitative advantage. Rainbow had
ninety percent Hispanic ownership. Metro had one black partner, which
constituted less than twenty percent of minority participation. Although the
qualitative comparisons between Rainbow and Metro were close, Rainbow's
substantial minority interest, and female ownership somewhat outweighed
Metro's local ownership and civic participation.
Winter and Metro appealed to the full Commission, which denied review of
the decision. Winter and Metro appealed the FCC's decision to the D.C. Circuit

421

Id. at 349.
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Court. As the appeal went forward, the FCC asked for a remand in light of its reexamination of the minority preference policies. The D.C. Circuit Court granted
the FCC's request. Subsequently, the FCC found Rainbow had no clear
quantitative advantage and that deletion of the minority preference would reverse
the outcome of the case. Therefore, the FCC held the case pending further
action in its re-examination on minority preference policies.
Shortly thereafter, President Ronald Reagan signed into law an
appropriations rider that prevented any type of re-examination or changing of the
minority preferences. 422 Congress also ordered the FCC to lift suspensions of
any proceedings and reinstate its prior policy. 423 Consequently, the FCC
reactivated the case and reaffirmed the Review Board's decision. Thus, the
appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court was renewed.
One of the major questions in this case was whether the minority
enhancement violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. This
question was similar to the question posed to the court in West Michigan. The
D.C. Circuit Court noted the similarities and decided that the enhancements for
minority status in this case were in accord with West Michigan. As such, the
enhancements were constitutionally permissible.
The minority preference, as supported in West Michigan, was reaffirmed in
this case because 1) the Commission's award of the preference was not a grant
of a specific number of stations nor was it a denial to non-minorities. The

422

See Chapter IV, Comparative License Hearings for a detailed explanation of the appropriation riders and
its accompanying public law.
423 873 F.2d 347 at 351.
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enhancement was only one factor in light of many factors; 2) the FCC's action in
this case was also attributed to a congressional action that recognized
underrepresentation of minorities in broadcast mass media. The policy was
designed to increase minority participation. That increased participation would
further the public interest goals of viewpoint diversity.
The lone dissenting opinion believed the force of West Michigan was
undermined by the case of Wygant and Croson. The FCC's justification of the
preferences being non-remedial could not survive the Croson decision.
Moreover, since the FCC never claimed that the policy was designed to remedy
the effects of past historical underrepresentation of minorities in broadcasting,
the FCC should reexamine Congress' intent in light of Wygant and Croson.
Also, congressional action (e.g., the appropriations riders) did not
necessarily indicate a mandate of racial preference schemes for the FCC. The
dissent argued that it "would seem anomalous for Congress to lock the FCC into
a policy broader than it [Congress] had ever before applied ... ".424 It was also
argued that the restriction placed on the FCC by the appropriations rider was
limited; so the FCC would be free to reexamine the policy. (However, it was
noted in Chapter IV that the appropriations riders were renewed every year up
until 1994. Although the court could not anticipate Congressional extension of the
riders when it decided Winter Park in 1989, such congressional action can be
interpreted as strong show of support for the policies and the related rationales.)

424
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Outlining the FCC's decision to institute racial preferences (outgrowth of TV 9
and Garrett), the dissent argued that underrepresentation was never linked to
discrimination, only an extension of program diversity. Further, the Commission
failed to consider non-racial solutions.

METRO BROADCASTING V. FCC (1990) 425
This closely decided Supreme Court case (5-4) was a result of two cases
previously heard in the D.C. Court of Appeals-

Winter Park and Shurberg.

Recalling the outcome in Winter Park, the Appeals Court upheld the FCC's
decision to grant a broadcast license to a minority entity through qualitative
enhancement credits in the comparative hearing process. However in Shurberg,
the court invalidated the distress sale policy as it determined that Shurberg's
equal protection rights had been violated.
Upon hearing these two cases, the Supreme Court had to decide if the
two minority preference policies were constitutional. In a decision marked by two
separate dissents, the court held neither the minority enhancement policy nor the
distress sale policy violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth
Amendment.

426

The majority opinion stated the FCC's minority ownership

programs were approved and authorized by Congress. In addition, raceconscious measures that are validated by Congress are permissible only if the
measures (a) serve important governmental objectives within the power of
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Congress, and (b) are substantially related to achieve those objectives. The
interest in enhancing broadcast diversity, according to the majority, was an
important government objective. As such, the distress sale policy and minority
enhancements in comparative hearings were substantially related to the
achievement of that government interest.
The case was significant because the majority's opinion upheld the FCC
policies as constitutional because the policies were viewed as being related to a
substantial government interest. Additionally, the policies were within the limits of
Congressional and administrative action. Most importantly, the ruling affirmed
that governmental decisions that rest on race classification could be permissible
as a remedy for past wrong, provided those decisions served a compelling and
substantial government interest.
However the dissenting opinions, led by the lengthy argument of Justice
O'Connor, 427 claimed that by upholding the FCC preferences, the Court departed
from fundamental principles and from the high court's traditional requirement that
racial classifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest. This departure, remarked Justice O'Connor,
indicated a renewed toleration of racial classifications and a negation of the
Constitution's equal protection guarantees, which should extend equally to all
citizens. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bound the federal
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government as well as the states; hence no intermediate level of scrutiny applies
to the federal government's use of racial classifications.
Neither of the dissents by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy agreed with
the majority's reliance on Fullilove or the application of intermediate scrutiny.
According to O'Connor, Fullilove applied at most only to congressional measures
that sought to remedy identified past discrimination. Justice Kennedy's opinion 428
went a step further in questioning the validity of viewing congressional mandates
as seen in Fullilove.
After the decision in Metro there was relatively little federal court activity
concerning minority preferences until 1993. In Betchel II, the minority
enhancement granted in comparative hearings was ruled invalid. When Viacom
wanted to sell its cable properties to an African-American broadcaster by using
the minority tax certificate, the tax gains that were deferrable amounted to over
$400 million dollars. That large monetary amount caught the eye of Congress
who swiftly moved to abolish the policy. After two hearings on the program (one
in the House, the other in Senate), the policy was repealed in 1995. Soon
afterwards, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was passed. This amendment
to the 1934 Communications Act, among other things, raised local ownership
limits, eliminated nationwide ownership caps, and replaced comparative hearings
with a process of competitive bidding.

428

Id. at 631.
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These changes had significant impacts on minority ownership. No longer
could minorities rely on enhancement credit when they sought to obtain a
license. The end of the tax certificate program removed enticements for white
owners to do business with minority groups. Without the policy, the bargaining
power of minorities was reduced greatly.
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CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS
While Metro Broadcasting seemed to be the Supreme Court's last word on
minority ownership preferences, a 1995 Supreme Court case countered that
decision. In Adarand Constructors Inc., v. Pena, 429 the Supreme Court held that
all racial classifications, proscribed by any governmental agent, must be
analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard of review. The decision in this case
overruled Metro and the rationales for minority ownership preferences. However,
the downfall of minority preferences did not start at Adarand. That case just
culminated years of growing resistance to such policies.

1970s: ACKNOWLEDGING THE ISSUE OF RACE
In TV 9, the majority wrote that reliance on the Communications Act, as a
colorblind document did not describe the breadth of the Act's public interest
criterion. 430 The notion of public interest provided the FCC with the discretion to
judge other factors believed to be relevant. Color blindness for the protection of
individual rights should not foreclose consideration of minority group
ownership. 431 The court wrote, "Inconsistency with the Constitution is not to be
found in a view of our developing national life which accords merit to black
participation .... "432 Black ownership was a broad concept to be given realistic
content. 433
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In the D.C. Circuit Court's supplemental opinion to TV 9, the FCC said it
was forced by the court to adopt a new comparative policy of awarding a
preference for black ownership. The Court disagreed. In fact, the court did not
rely solely on the race of the owner and its did not dictate a preference at all.
Distinguishing merit from preference, the court stated that a preference was a
FCC decision on the qualities of an applicant, whereas merit was designated as
favorable consideration that may or may not result in an actual preference. Under
the already established criterion of public interest in broad community
representation and best practicable service, Comint was entitled to an award of
merit. According to the court, a preference did not necessarily follow from their
decision. Other applicants were not foreclosed from seeking similar merit.
In the case of Garrett v. FCC, the Circuit court recognized that WEUP was
only one of a few black operated stations in the United States. 434 At that time
(1973), 33 out of approximately 7,000 radio stations were minority owned. As for
television, none of the one thousand television stations were minority owned. As
such, it was important to take into account the service that WEUP would provide
to the minority population of Huntsville. Since TV 9 served as the precedent
case, the rationales used in that case were applied in Garrett.
The Court's argument in both of these cases is clear. While the court
dictated no specific policy, the FCC was instructed to view minority ownership
with a social and historical approach, taking into account industry trends and the
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realities of society. Interestingly, these cases were decided in the middle 1970sduring a time when the country was looking to fill the promises of the civil rights
movement. The Kerner Commission, in 1968, maintained the media had done a
poor job in communicating the needs and concerns of minority groups to
American society. 435 The visibility of blacks (and other racial groups) in the media
was low and often stereotypical. More importantly, the Kerner Commission
speculated about what affect these images would have on white society and the
interaction between the races.
The Kerner report led to the FCC's adoption of equal employment
opportunity provisions. 436 In acknowledging the lack of progress made with
earlier efforts to increase minority participation in the media, the FCC determined
that minority ownership was needed to create diversity in the types of messages
and programming presented to the public. 437
The Kerner report was followed by a report from the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights. 438 Noting how the civil rights movement had captured the American
public with vivid TV images, the report observed that television gave particular
groups and individual's status. It followed that those chosen individuals and
groups for media coverage were receiving attention to the detriment of those
groups and individuals who were not.
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At the time of the TV 9 and Garrett ruling, the FCC was trying to become
part of the solution. By recognizing that its race-neutral polices had not helped to
bring minorities into the broadcast industry or diversify viewpoints, the FCC
adopted polices that provided opportunities for employment and ownership. The
above reports, coupled with civil and social unrest, prompted many to believe
that white majority control over the media affected how minorities were portrayed.
Such control over the media by the white majority would also influence messages
communicated to the general public.439 In agreement, the Kerner Commission
asserted that white dominated media would not communicate with nor provide
message and programming appealing to minority audiences. 440
More importantly, race was understood to be a symbol of cultural identity
and a product of society. Consequently, race discrimination was treated as a
societal issue. Affirmative action programs, set-asides, and various programs to
promote racial equality began to emerge. Anti-discrimination policies were
designed to remove the conditions that continued to subordinate blacks.
Affirmative action, to some extent, equalized and redistributed power, resources,
and wealth. 441 Such policies called upon judicial support to advance the removal
of racial oppression. 442
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The 1960s were marked by heightened social and political activism. 443
The Johnson administration tried to increase participation by disadvantaged and
marginalized groups. 444 Grassroots organizations, community groups, and
minority organizations began to transform their concerns and political agendas
into concrete actions, especially within the communications industry. 445 Their
impacts, though successful, were short lived. Inflation and productivity decline in
the late 1970s were crucial forces behind the subsequent changes in various
industries, such as communications. 446
During this period, racial discrimination was primarily viewed from
Freeman's "victim" perspective. Racial discrimination consisted of "conditions of
actual social existence as a member of a perpetual underclass." 447 Events such
as unemployment and homelessness, combined with the human feelings
associated with those events (despair, anger, etc.) created a certain social
condition. 448 By removing the feelings and the related conditions, racial
discrimination could be remedied.
This is important to note, because in the 1980s group rights and remedies
were no longer viewed in that manner. Critical race theorist Kimberle Crenshaw
asserted that affirmative action, during this period, was viewed as a mechanism
that undermined the inherent property interest in being white and the related
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social status of being white. 449 Agreeing with that idea, critical race theorist
Cheryl Harris wrote that affirmative action and race preference polices
threatened to "dismantle the actual and expected privilege that has attended
white skin since the founding of the country.',450

1980s: QUESTIONING THE RACE FACTOR
By the late 1970s, those who were privileged (i.e., white majority) began to
see a tightening job market. 451 As employment opportunities began to dwindle,
resentment grew toward polices that provided an "unfair advantage" to others. 452
Affirmative-action policies were attacked as a form of "reverse discrimination". 453
As the 1980s approached, racial discrimination began to take on what
Freeman labeled the "perpetrator" viewpoint. 454 In this viewpoint, racial
discrimination was viewed as an action or series of actions inflicted upon a victim
by a specific perpetrator. Removed from social or historical contexts, the
perpetrator becomes the focus of the remedy. Freeman linked this idea to
misconstrued notions of fault and causation. 455 The fault in anti-discrimination law
goes to specific individuals, which separates that person from society as a whole.
Causation detaches the singular instance of discrimination from the total range of
experiences that could be associated with the discrimination.
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The focus of racial discrimination began to shift towards the specific action
and specific individuals, rather than the overall existence of systemic racial
inequities. 456 By labeling discriminatory actions as unintentional, responsibility
for the effects of such conduct can be evaded. 457 Freeman cautioned that
faultfinding with specific individuals would create "a class of innocents who need
not feel any responsibility for conditions associated with discrimination and would
feel great resentment when called upon to bear any burden in connection with
remedying violations." 458 Indeed, cases like Shurberg serve as an example of
what Freeman had described. While the parties in Shurberg were exercising
their right under an established FCC provision, the challenger (Shurberg) felt he
was unduly burdened by the policy. The court acknowledged that the FCC's
purpose in establishing the distress sale policy was to promote diverse
programming. 459 And while accepting the FCC's rationale, the court stated
" ... the distress sale policy requires innocent third parties to shoulder excessive
burden." 460
The case of West Michigan noted that underrepresentation of minorities in
the media and ownership had the support and weight of congressional action.461
In fact, Congress expressed in a 1982 conference report that the
underrepresentation of minorities in the mass media was a direct result of past
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racial discrimination.

462

The court deferred to that congressional action and

dismissed any constitutional violations. While the appellant tried to assert that
minority enhancements worked where there was a sizable minority population,
the court and the FCC rejected that argument. Minority enhancements were
never premised on matching broadcasters to specific communities of a specific
size. Rather they [enhancements] were linked to general diversity of viewpoints
in the media, regardless of community size and/or location. This case reinforced
the concept of group rights in remedying discrimination. Minority ownership was
viewed as a way to address the lack of minority group participation in radio and
television.
Crenshaw remarked that the Reagan administration symbolized the
emergence of hostility towards government. 463 Reagan's attempts to fire
members of the Civil Rights Commission, his veto of the Civil Rights Restoration
Act are cited as overt actions taken during the administration that showed some
hostility to the furtherance of minority rights and causes. 464 Horowitz remarked
that during the Reagan administration there was a great push to reduce the role
of government in social regulation. The Paperwork Reduction Act (which was
started under the Carter administration) and other policies aimed at removing
government from the economy of many business and industries were cited as
examples. 465 By appointing administrators hostile to regulation of any kind,
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instituting agency cutbacks, and through non-enforcement the Reagan
administration tried to remove all forms of social regulation. 466
That hostility was transformed into a formalized, colorblind view, which
called for the removal of affirmative action and other preference based policies.
During this time, many commentators remarked that the goals of the civil rights
movement had been reached.467 As Nan observed, social attitude surveys
showed growing resentment towards affirmative action as a majority of American
society believed that the previously labeled "disadvantaged" had become the
privileged. 468
Some suggest that the colorblind view of the Constitution was developed
in conservative think tanks as a way to combat civil rights policies. 469 Seeing
such policies as a "threat to the democratic political system," 470 affirmative action
and race-based policies were signaled out for attack. In addition to attacking the
premise of affirmative action and race-based policies, remedies for discrimination
became limited to those who could "actually" prove some harm.471 This
colorblind approach to anti-discrimination law purports a "common ownership"
where everyone is equally protected under the Constitution.
The colorblind rhetoric was transformed in the broadcasting industry
through broadcast deregulation. Broadcast policies such as ascertainment
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(required broadcasters to survey local community to determine what the needs
were), anti-trafficking (required stations to be held for no less than three years),
and license challenges (ability to challenge a license holder for poor or
inconsistent service) allowed the voice of marginalized persons to be heard.
Their removal prompted serious concerns for minority groups. For example, Ray
noted, once the anti-trafficking rule was eliminated, "the number of TV stations
sold annually after being held less than two years had increased by eightfold." 472
Such activity was the early precursor to mergers, acquisitions, and eventually
industry consolidation.
Regulation was considered a contributor to the falling economic
productivity. Businesses no longer supported regulation as they began to worry
about how the social and economic impacts of the 1970s would affect the future
of profits. 473 While the industries and business were moving away from
regulation, the courts had begun to view regulatory agencies as experts on the
interest of consumers and the public.474 To that end, the courts deferred to the
agencies and to congressional legislation proscribed to the agencies. 475 A
tension developed between businesses that wanted less control from the
government and government agencies that saw fit to regulate businesses and
their activities in the interest of the public.
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During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the broadcast industry was
striving for deregulation. The FCC was taking cognizance of new technologies
such as direct broadcast satellite, multipoint distribution services, cable services,
and low power television. 476 As the Commission sought to integrate newer
services with traditional broadcast, it removed regulations that were deemed to
be prohibitive of new growth. Programming logs, restrictions on group ownership
and certain content-based regulations were removed in order to encourage
growth and competition. 477
One of the industry's changes in the late 1970s was the rise of FM radio.
As Howard and Zeigler wrote, listenership for FM radio was expanding during
this time. 478 In 1975, FM radio was considered an auxiliary service to the
dominant AM radio. 479 Responding to industry demands, economic, and
technological developments, the FCC wanted to promote FM services. 480 In a
1983 order, the FCC adopted new rules that increased the number of FM
stations and provided spectrum space for approximately 700 new FM stations. 481
Even though the Commission had expanded the ability of daytime stations
to broadcast, 482 the NTIA believed that daytime stations would be in a poor
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competitive position with the FM stations. 483 Although the FCC wanted to expand
the possibilities of FM usage, it also wanted to provide comparative hearing
enhancements for daytime AM operators competing for FM license. This
enhancement would be similar to minority enhancements in similar situations. In

National Black Media Coalition, appellants argued that the enhancement would
threaten the ability of minorities to compete for FM stations.
The FCC provided a divestiture provision with the daytime enhancement.
The owner had to divest him/herself of the existing AM station in order to receive
the enhancement in a comparative hearing for a new FM station. 484 This
provision seemed fair on first glance. The policy, however, was limiting.
The Coalition noted that for communities with populations over 25,000
people, only 93 stations would be available. 485 And an estimated number of
sixteen stations would be available only to daytime AM stations. 486 That
translated into fewer opportunities for minority groups. The trading of stations had
begun to increase as the industry deregulated. As a result, the value of newly
purchased FM stations increased. 487 As Reeves noted, FM stations were viewed
as profitable and were "being sold at multiples of up to 15 times projected cash
flow." 488 The FM stations' value was being based upon future earning potential,
not on what was being generated from already existing FM stations.
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Conversely, most AM stations had been purchased years ago when the
frequencies had first become available. The AM stations that existed were
presumably good frequencies, which was important to attracting customers and
advertising. A higher price for a well established, profitable AM station was more
likely to occur than for an FM station whose values had yet to be proven. Even
though the FM frequency would become more dominant, initially AM stations
were still desired as profitable radio properties.
While preserving and maintaining minority ownership had been a major
priority until this point, the National Black Media Coalition case showed where the
needs of the industry and majority interests over ..rode the interests of minority
groups. This may have translated to a blockage of early minority participation in
the allocation of new FM services. More importantly, the Commission rejected
petitions that suggested a preference for minorities applying for new FM
stations. 489 The ability to perceive potential impacts on minority ownership was
outweighed by the promotion of FM radio.
The ruling in National Black Media Coalition suggested that minorities did
not need additional help in accessing new FM services. However by its own
admission in its 1978 report, the FCC discovered that bias and discrimination in
advertising, the inability to discover of available properties and lack of financing
were all impediments to minority involvement. 490
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Concerning the argument for using race-neutral policies, most of the FCC
ownership policies were already race-neutral. However, relying on race neutral
policies creates, "an illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor
responsible for the position of the black underclass." 491 Relying solely on raceneutral policies leaves the impression that race is unimportant and bares no
impact or influence on systemic processes. Even when the Commission
instituted rules that were not directly related to ownership, were race-neutral, and
would help gather input from minorities, 492 it acknowledged, "views of racial
minorities continued to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media."493
(The majority in Metro would note that the ascertainment policy, a decidedly race
neutral measure, had failed to determine the programming needs of a
community.) 494
The distress sale policy did not mandate the owner to sell the property. In
fact, the owner had an option to proceed with a hearing and take his/her
chances. Nothing precluded the owner from trying to sell the property through
some other mechanism. Moreover, before the 1975 addition of the minority
component to the distress sale policy, owners were able to use the policy in
circumstances such as bankruptcy or extreme health conditions.
In TV 9, the D.C. Circuit Court wrote that regardless of whether one called
the Communications Act (or even the Constitution) a colorblind document,
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attempts to live up to public interest objectives should not be ignored. 495 Since
providing society with divergent viewpoints was judged a necessary component
of the Communications Act, inclusion of marginalized and disadvantaged people
worked to serve the overall public interest goals. Yet, in Shurberg those very
ideals were viewed as weak arguments for minority ownership policies. 496

Shurberg focused on "race" as a preference, rather than seeing the
"policy" as a preference. The line was drawn when a white applicant believed his
own race hindered him from competing for a broadcast license. The majority
opinion in Shurberg found it impossible to say someone's race had a profound
effect on his or her profession. In fact, the court said such assumptions could be
called "stereotyping." 497
Nevertheless, the court did not take into consideration studies that were
conducted that showed differences in the race of owners and programming.
Studies had confirmed racial differences affected the type of music played on
stations, 498 employment opportunities, 499 and the type of news covered. 500 While
other factors would inevitably affect a broadcaster's ability to serve the public,
race should not be discounted as a realistic factor in how that service is provided.
In spite of the evidence that affirmed the importance of race, the distress sale
policy was ruled unconstitutional.
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No longer concerned with maintaining that diversity in ownership would
lead to diversity in programming, the court adopted the position that
underrepresentation was not a cause for minority ownership preferences. The
policy was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination. 501 The link that

.

seemingly existed between minority ownership and diversity of viewpoint in prior
cases had disappeared.
Critical legal scholars, such as Gotanda, provide explanations as to why
the link disappeared. According to Gotanda, the courts equated discrimination,
not with social conditions or effects, but to intentional action(s). 502 Limiting
discrimination to intentional acts hindered the ability to address racial
discrimination in its totality because each social problem was disconnected from
the main component of racism. 503
Such an approach disparages the importance of social and historical
factors that contributes to racial inequality--factors that cannot be easily
identified, but are embedded in our society. For example, Ofori's study
documents, through interviews and analysis of advertising revenue figures, the
subtle discrimination that takes place within the broadcasting industry. 504 While
those in the industry may speak of the discriminatory practice such as non-urban
dictates and minority discounts, to ask a minority to clearly identify an
"intentional" harm that has resulted from these practices poses quite a challenge.
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And when viewed in the larger context of broadcast ownership, advertising is the
life that supports the health and growth of broadcast stations. Profits, from the
sale of advertising, are the key to success. To disassociate the problems of
advertising discrimination from the overall challenges of broadcast ownership
would make it hard for a minority to explain and prove actual harm. And as
Lawrence wrote,
"requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand
about how the human mind works." 505

The dissenting opinion in Shurberg had recognized that only thirty-three
stations had been sold to minorities since 1978.506 In the eleven preceding years,
only a small number of stations had been exchanged using this policy. It was
hardly an overused policy that burdened a potential license holder; the burden
was minimal and focused on eradicating obstacles brought on by discrimination.
Winter Park, decided only a few months after Shurberg, was very different
in rationale and contrast. As the court relied on West Michigan as the controlling
case, congressional action was important to understanding the need for minority
preferences. While Shurberg downplayed congressional support and involvement
with minority ownership, the majority in Winter Park saw congressional support
as validation of public interest goals and as a way to overcome discrimination
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against minorities. In stating the FCC's goal in the creation of the policy, the court
wrote it was
"Designed to increase the participation of minority groups
in the broadcast industry in furtherance of the public
interest goal of diversity-to enhance the public's exposure
through programming on broadcast stations of the
significant diverse groups that make up the nation."507

The congressional influence considered important in the majority was
seen as weak in the dissent. Although the dissent noted congressional action
was a constitutionally necessary function in responding to societal problems, no
empirical evidence had been presented that showed discrimination existed in the
industry or any government agent.
Both Shurberg and Winter Park were decided at a time when affirmative
action programs were constantly being challenged. 508 Regulations of any kind
were viewed as a constraint. As Horowitz suggested, socially derived regulation
(which minority preferences would be considered) had affected a broadcaster's
degree of calculated risk.509 There were costs associated with the compliance of
government regulations. As such, regulations deprived business of its ability to
exercise private privilege and autonomy. 510
When deregulation began in the broadcast industry, it was proposed as a
way to reduce paperwork and get broadcasters back into the business of
broadcasting. The removals of government-sponsored regulations were equated
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with marketplace freedom, which was supposed to lead to consumer choice. As
Horowitz aptly stated, regulation was a "class" issue, with regulation and
government action seen as being dictatorial over the industry. Furthermore, the
judiciary began to shift away from seeing regulatory agencies as guardians of
public interest, as they asserted the marketplace might be the best place to
decide the issue of public interest. 511 This was solidified in the early 1980s when
the courts, in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,512
approved legislation that eliminated socially favorable policies at the FCC.513
While those changes may have provided robust opportunities for new
technologies and allowed broadcasters to operate at better efficiency, the
removal of social regulation removed the discussion of race and minority groups.
Diversity and the marketplace of ideas were to be delivered by an unrestricted
market. 514 Hence, the application of viewpoint diversity became problematic in
the deregulated broadcast market.515 Horowitz suggested that as technologies
changed and the market evolved, the broad notions of public interest got lost. 516
Corporate and business interests are perceived as more important, where the
needs of disadvantaged and underrepresented groups are seen as secondary.
Standing on the side of businesses was part of President Reagan's goal when he
initialized his plan of supply-side economics (also known as trickle down
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economics). The assumption was that by providing tax cuts to big business,
entrepreneurs would be encouraged to use their profits as an incentive to be
more productive, increase employment and to re-invest. However, instead of
looking to re-invest profits, many industries (especially broadcasting) sought to
remove government restrictions on how they conducted business. This equated
to a reduced emphasis on public interest. Both free market rhetoric and
deregulation in the telecommunications industry intensified during the 1990s,
which, according to Horowitz, damaged any hopes of continuing with social
regulation within the industry. 517

1990s: RECONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING RACE
The decision in Metro Broadcasting, although closely decided, was a
warm reassurance that the courts still considered race and the historical
discrimination against minorities as important. Race and ethnic identity provided
a relevant basis for preference policies, if they were narrowly tailored to meet a
specific, compelling interest. The majority correctly noted that minorities were late
entrants into media ownership and were often handicapped, as they usually
owned less valuable properties that served smaller audiences in geographically
limited areas. 518 The fact that the Supreme Court recognized the considerable
obstacles that minorities had to overcome presented a clear understanding of
how race and discrimination combined to effectively keep minorities out of
broadcast ownership.
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The Supreme Court majority based their support of minority
enhancements in comparative hearings and the distress sale policy on several
issues. First, these polices promoted program diversity, which was asserted to be
a compelling government interest. The policies had an overall benefit for society,
not just minority groups. Second, the policy remedied past discrimination against
minorities in ownership by providing entrance into the industry. The majority
accurately reasoned that minority ownership policies and the quest for
programming diversity did not mean programs that appealed to minorities would
not appeal to non-minorities. 519 Nor did it mean that in every case minority
ownership would lead to minmity programming or a minority viewpoint.
The Supreme Court wrote that the Commission never completely relied on
market forces to ensure audience needs were met. 520 Economics and economic
theory cannot be the only determining factors regarding broadcast and
telecommunications reform. There is a strong need to consider other factors,
such as societal and consumer concerns as well as industry competition. 521 That
was in 1990. As discussed in chapters I and 11,since the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, the marketplace was the sole dictator of how audience needs were
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met. Minority interests continue to go unfulfilled, as demonstrated in the recent
boycotts of network programming 522 and the loss of minority owned stations. 523
The dissent disputed the need for racial preferences, stating that raceneutral polices should be used. However, the "Blue Book," the industry's first
attempt at outlining public interest in broadcasting was a race-neutral document
aimed at encouraging diversity of content. By the late 1960s and throughout
1970s it became evident that relying on race neutral polices to provide
programming diversity was not working, at least in terms of minority
programming. 524
The dissent vigorously argued for race neutral policies that would help the
nation become a "society untouched by a history of exclusion." 525 Such
aspirations, wrote Justice O'Connor, were the thrust of the Constitution. But
according to Bell, it is the inability of whites to recognize and accept the fact that
discrimination still exists that hinders the overall efforts to achieve racial
balance. 526 And although O'Connor stated the use of race classifications may
stigmatize racial or ethnic groups, 527 that perspective overlooks the long-standing
history of racial discrimination against minority groups. 528
Some argue that whites are not willing to accept accountability for the
problems that currently exist nor do they deem any level of personal sacrifice
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necessary to right systematic or societal wrongs. 529 The evidence that whites are
still unable to accept the deep-rooted effects of racism can be inferred from the
continued debate over affirmative action and preferential programs. 530 O'Connor
suggests that race could never be used in ways that would not burden individuals
who were not members of the preferred racial group. 531 But when systemic
racism and discrimination marginalizes segments of society, how should the
government go about protecting their concerns? Aren't those groups still unduly
burdened in ways beyond their control?

1990S AND BEYOND: WHAT LIES AHEAD
Out of all the ownership policies, tax certificates were the only policy
strongly supported by the NAB.532 Because the policy presented a situation
where minorities and white media owners would both profit, the industry
embraced it. The distress sale was strongly opposed because, as Barlow
reflected on the concerns of minority media owners, there was a concern that
"unscrupulous minority groups would use the policy to blackmail white station
owners. "533 It seemed senseless to assume that minorities would mount a
campaign to blackmail major white-owned station owners to turn over their
properties. Even Justice Scalia quashed the thought of a great minority backlash
through preference polices as he stated in Fullilove that "the federal government
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is unlikely to be captured by minority racial or ethnic groups and used as an
instrument of discrimination." 534
The FCC considered setting aside spectrum frequency for minorities,
however that idea was rejected because the predominance of white broadcasters
would not be able to benefit." 535 As recently as the early 1990s, major
broadcasting groups were willing to provide investment finds for minorities
seeking station ownership. However, the caveat was that white owners would be
allowed to increase their ownership caps and nationwide concentration. 536 Such
stipulations provide real-life testimony to Bell's interest-convergence theory. It
would seem that through the acceptance of some polices and through the
rejection of others, the fate of minority broadcast owners is inextricably tied to the
overall profit and concentration potential for major media conglomerations.

534

497 U.S. 547 at 566.
Barlow,supranote 84 at 252.
536 Rich Media, Poor Democracy,supranote 141 at 67. Rupert Murdoch,and his Fox group, soughtan
increasethe nationwidecoverageof its TV stationsfrom 35% to 45%. In exchange,Murdochproposedto
donateup to $150 million dollarsto an investmentfund for minority broadcasters.
535

139

CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to explore the concept of race in minority
ownership policies through the analysis of court decisions. While none of the
cases analyzed specifically addressed the issue of tax certificates, the issues of
comparative hearings and distress sales were thoroughly examined.
Question 1: In what ways have the courts viewed the issue of race and
diversity in broadcast ownership?
The courts initially viewed race within the broadcast media as a social
concept and a way to diversify media ownership and media content. When
deregulation began to occur, race was viewed as a discriminatory agent in the
open broadcasting marketplace.
Legally and socially, the concept of race was initially defined in terms of
group rights, as seen in TV 9 and Garrett. Looking back to the civil rights
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, race was a condition that placed certain
segments of society at a disadvantage. With the remnants of segregation
embedded in society, race was seen as a label. In order to correct the injustices
done to races, policies needed to be sensitive and inclusive of all social groups.
Up until 1995, the Supreme Court (and the lower courts) had deferred to federal
agencies and the creation of affirmative action programs. In fact, the standard of
review was intermediate scrutiny, which viewed racial classifications under a less
suspect lens.
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Racial preferences in broadcasting were based upon social benefits and
the public interest- the more diverse people involved in broadcasting, the better
the chances of wide-ranging programming. Diversity of programming (and
ownership) was elucidated through the concepts of the "marketplace of ideas"
and varied viewpoints. These principles considered part of the First Amendment,
as such the FCC (through its creation and subsequent authorities and powers
granted to the agency) was charged with upholding the First Amendment. As
seen in TV 9, Garrett, and West Michigan, the courts acknowledged that
minorities could contribute to the overall goal of viewpoint diversity. As such,
when minorities were seeking to be included in broadcast programming and
ownership, policies that provided them an opportunity to do so would be upheld.
However, as economic and social changes took place, there was a
backlash against such policies. Such policies were perceived as forms of
"reverse discrimination" against the white majority. During the 1980s, preference
policies began to be invalidated, as the court no longer saw their purposes as
legitimate. Race neutral laws replaced racial consciousness in the law. Supreme
Court cases such as Bakke, Croson, and Adarand started the move away from
race-consciousness towards race-neutrality. As critical race theorists lament, this
colorblind view of anti-discrimination law has separated injustices against
minorities from their social and historical roots. In fact, removing racial
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distinctions does very little to actually prevent discrimination and it makes
attempts to identify and correct discrimination very difficult. 537
Group rights and historical perspectives of racial discrimination gave way
to individual harms. Group rights that were supported in cases like TV9 and
Garrett were disregarded as illegitimate. Discrimination against groups began to
be attributed to individual actions in isolated, specific contexts. As such, minority
preferences were challenged because they did not conform to the new legal
standard of race-neutrality as seen in the cases of National Black Media Coalition
and Shurberg. But focusing on individual harms perpetrated on minority groups
does not address the social conditions that cause discrimination to exist in the
first place. 538
As in Adarand, when a federal highway contracting provision was
invalidated, the effects rippled to other areas such as broadcasting and were
seen in the Metro Broadcasting case. Shurberg and Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting spoke of the need to exclude the past
from the present, in hopes for a better future. For society (and the broadcasting
industry) to be more diverse, race needed to be removed from the law.
Preference polices were often labeled as "stereotyping" all minorities to think,
feel, and act the same way. However, that analysis is somewhat faulty in that
there is a shared cultural experience within every racial group. Furthermore,
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when a case is decided it sets a precedent for other cases that turn on similar
issues, regardless of the circumstances of the case. So where a case involving a
federal affirmative action set-aside for the highway construction industry
ultimately influenced how the FCC could construct and administer policies that
dealt with minority ownership in the media. To assume that the notion of truly
"individualized" remedies exists may not be completely accurate. 539
Bell argued that race neutrality erects barriers to achieving racial relief. 540
As minorities look to challenge bias and discrimination, they must present proof
of actual behavior .that produced a discriminatory effect and caused harm. Even
armed with that proof, Bell asserts that the relief due would be limited to a very
specific context. 541 While it may be easy to identify a placard that reads "No
Blacks Allowed" in a public facility as proof of discrimination, it becomes much
harder to document discrimination in the privately held broadcast industry. As so
many factors can figure into the purchase and success of a broadcast station,
identifying every instance of discrimination trivializes the true inequities that exist.
While the FCC rationales for minority ownership policies were still in
effect, the factual basis that had long supported the policies had been
questioned. Minority ownership policies were not tailored expressly to meet the
goals of viewpoint diversity. The dissents written in Metro Broadcasting
questioned whether the rationales of viewpoint diversity were compelling enough
for race-conscious measures. This reflection in court decisions since Metro
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Broadcasting has hampered the FCC's ability to support its minority ownership
policies or to create new ones. Note that the courts speak generally of the
Constitution's extension of rights to individual citizens. Yet that concept contrasts
with the way the First Amendment is often viewed. Closely tied to the
marketplace of ideas, the First Amendment justifies free expression because of
the benefits to society. This creates a conflict of interest, as the rights of
individuals are advocated above all and then society and groups are seen as the
basis for certain portions of the Constitution.
Question 2: Is there a difference in the rationales used among the various
courts (e.g., Supreme Court versus Courts of Appeal) in deciding minority
ownership cases?
Yes, there was change in the rationales used by the courts in deciding
minority ownership cases. Even within the courts of appeals, there was some
division as to what basis such cases would be decided.
The courts shifted in their interpretation of FCC rationales for minority
ownership policies. Initially, the policies were supported as a way to diversify
viewpoints and as a way to overcome discrimination. Overall, the rationales used
by the D.C. Circuit Court and the Supreme Court was similar in many respects.
Both courts deferred to administrative agencies (FCC) and congressional action,
as they [courts] recognized Congress' power to promote the interest of society.
However, it is evident that the D.C. Circuit Court began to change its
approach to minority ownership polices. In National Black Media Coalition, the
courts allowed the industry's focus on technological advancements to prevail
144

over citizen concerns. With the coming of new technologies such as personal
communication services (PCS), high-definition television (HDTV), and digital
broadcast satellite (DBS), the FCC was looking to advance pro-industry,
deregulatory policies. Congress soon followed the FCC's stance as comparative
hearings were replaced with competitive bidding. The courts, without questioning
what impact these changes may have had on minorities, upheld the deregulation
of the industry.

CONCLUSION
Although minority ownership figures have improved slightly, the number of
minority owned broadcast facilities is still relatively low. Financing still creates a
huge barrier for many minorities, as financiers consider investing in such
ventures as a "high-risk". 542 Of the $90 billion dollars of institutional equity capital
invested in United States businesses, less than $2 million is targeted for minority
start-ups. 543 Whites, who tend not to invest in minority ventures, control the
majority of the financing. Minority-owned firms control only one percent of funds
in the venture capital community. 544 Without financing, minority owners are often
unable to buy properties. However, new venture capitalists, such as
Queztal/Chase Capital Partners, are willing to invest monies for women and

542 Many of the owners did not have a great deal of broadcasting experience. Moreover, for those who did,
financiers considered investing in broadcast properties to be risky, as such properties were licensed and
controlled by government authorities.
543 Christopher Williams, In The Minority: Venture Capitalists Focused on Non-mainstream Deals are Making
Headway, Slowly, BARRONS, June 5, 2000 at 34.
544 Id.
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minority communications companies. 545 So things may be on the up swing, but
only time will tell.
For those minority owners who own broadcast stations, competing for
advertising dollars has always been difficult, even more so since deregulation.
Stations that are programmed specifically for minority audiences are still unable
to earn as much revenue (per listener) as more "general programming"
stations. 546 Even though minority owned stations that carry minority programming
average sixty-five percent greater revenues than small, majority competitors,
general market non-minority broadcasters average revenues that are fourteen
percent greater than minority owners in the same format. 547 As Ofori observed,
minority owned stations are under performing in terms of power ratios as
compared to majority broadcasters across similar formats. 548 Even more
compelling is evidence that majority broadcasters that air minority programming
still garner more revenues than minority owners who provide similar
programming-twenty

percent more on the average. 549

Even when market size is held constant, black stations were lower priced
than white stations. 550 While the lower price was attributed to format and
audience characteristics, 551 recent studies affirm this to be true and note that
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black audiences are extremely undervalued. 552 It is this underestimation of black
audiences, by advertisers, that results in lower advertising revenues. 553 Lack of
substantial advertising revenue, in addition to competition from group owned
stations, may cause a minority broadcaster to sell its stations.
In spite of continued advertising discrimination, deregulatory effects, and
poor financing, there are a few minority broadcasters that are succeeding. Radio
One, founded in 1981 by African-American broadcaster Cathy Hughes, has
managed to amass over twenty radio stations. 554 Many of those stations are
located in the top twenty African-American media markets. As recently as March
2000, the company managed to purchase twelve radio stations in seven different
markets. 555 In addition, the majority of the stations are programmed with an
urban-contemporary format. 556 And according to an Arbitron report, urban
formats are the most popular and well-listened formats for black Americans. 557
Nevertheless, deregulation has had a profound impact on minority
participation in the broadcast industry. Socioeconomic factors preclude the
existence of minority advocacy that has existed in the 1960s and 1970s. As a
result, the market has been unwilling to sustain a real effort to address minority
issues and provide diverse programming. Minority interests are not being met, as
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demonstrated in the recent boycotts of network programming 558 and the loss of
minority owned stations. 559
FCC public interest arguments have valued diversity in programming and
ownership. Observing the small number of minority owners, policies were created
to increase broadcast ownership participation in hopes of diversifying viewpoints
and programming. And for a time, judicial and government involvement
supported those policies.
However, the link that once existed between minority ownership and the
diversity of viewpoint argument has disappeared. Individual harm, combined with
race-neutral thinking foreclosed consideration of minority group ownership. All
minorities do not think the same way. However, relying on that simple
assumption to address the need (or lack of a need) for minority ownership is
inaccurate.
As the majority accurately reasoned in Metro Broadcasting, minority
ownership policies and the quest for programming diversity did not mean
programs that appealed to minorities would not appeal to non-minorities. 560 Nor
did it mean that in every case minority ownership would lead to minority
programming or a minority viewpoint. Minority ownership policies ought to
produce a more reflective media, accommodating other interpretations, images,
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and views. Judge Wald, writing the dissent in Shurberg, said the distress sale
policy rested on "the assumption that viewers and listeners of every race will
benefit from access to a broader range of programming .... "561
I certainly agree with the Metro Broadcasting majority in that minority
programming produces a more reflective media and a recent study supports that
supposition as well. A 2001 study of minority and non-minority broadcast owned
radio and television stations revealed that news directors at minority owned
stations were significantly more likely to report stories geared towards specific
audiences, specifically minority audiences. 562 Minority owned radio stations were
more often to report public affair programming that was appealing to minorities
and were more likely to employ a greater percentage of on-air personnel who
were racial and ethnic minorities. 563 Overall, the study showed that minority radio
stations owners were more integrated into the station and played active roles in
news and public affairs decisions, as the race of owners played a role in the
focus of programming aimed at minority audiences. 564
While these results do not necessarily hold true for television station
(minority or non-minority owned), I would argue that in fact minority programming
differs greatly from majority programming. A few years back when the Fox
Network comedy show "Living Single" was considered for cancellation, minority
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groups waged a massive phone and e-mail campaign to save the show. 565 When
looking at viewing patterns among the white population, "Living Single" ranked in
the bottom 100 shows in the Nielsen ratings. However, in black viewing
households the show was consistently in the top 20s. As Newton Minow
observed, present overall programming is not aimed at the public taste:
"Ratings tell us only that some people have their television
sets turned on ... a rating at best is and indication of how
many people saw what you gave them." 566

Similarly, blacks and whites tend to enjoy different types of
programming. 567 For example, the top 5 shows in black viewing households
during the 1996-1997 season were: 1) Living Single, 2) NY Undercover, 3)
Martin, 4) Family Matters, and 5) Moesha. In contrast, the top five shows for
white viewers were: 1) Seinfield, 2) Friends, 3) Suddenly Susan, 4) ER, and 5)
Monday Night Football. 568 Many of the "black-oriented" programs have little
crossover value to white audiences, especially during prime time. 569 As a result,
reaching minorities through prime time programming is difficult. 570
Two former African-American network television producers, Claudia Pryor
and Gregory Branch, know first hand how difficult it can be to convince network
executives to include minorities in programming. They both note that many
network executives view stories about blacks or stories with black characters as
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"not marketable."

571

Bri/1's Content magazine conducted a survey of television

news magazines, such as 20/20 and 48 Hours, shows over a two-month period.
What they found was that the three major networks did very little to show minority
stories to the general public: NBC (0%), ABC (7%), and CBS (25%). 572 The
comments of Pryor and Branch echo what many network executives already
knew as over twenty of the executives and reporters interviewed stated race was
a "simmering" yet rarely discussed issue. 573 Often, stories with a minority focus
are ignored due to lack of approval when the story is initially pitched to
executives or if the story does pass the initial pitch, the failure to pass the
rigorous screening process because black characters undergo tougher
scrutiny. 574 To further complicate matters, most of the executive producers for
network television news magazine shows are white males.
The ability to think of America as a culturally singular nation, as suggested
by Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting, might be compromised. As
McChesney observed, we (America) "increasingly have little exposure to cultural
experiences of broad sectors of society." 575 This lack of crossover value might be
explained by lngber's contention that the marketplace functions with a bias
towards the status quo. 576 Established groups [media companies] accept ideas
[programming] and alternatives [competition] from within the dominant culture,
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which Ingber says only encourages a limited range of ideas from a limited group
of marketplace participants. Thus the marketplace of ideas has very little impact
on diversity of viewpoints. 577 This can be supported, practically, by industry
behavior. Schmidt observed that many executives feel viewers do not want to
see news stories that feature characters "unlike" themselves.

578

The stories are

designed to be appealing to a mass audience, which tend to be middle class
whites. It is exactly these types of approaches to programming at the network
level that leave little in the way of diverse opportunities in news and
entertainment.

SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
As recently as the early 1990s, major broadcasting groups were willing to
provide investment funds for minorities seeking station ownership. However,
such ideas are still tied to the advancement of white broadcasters. There are
other ways that the industry, the regulators, and the judiciary can help promote
effective minority ownership policies.
FCC Solutions

The FCC, along with Congress and the Internal Revenue Service, should
re-institute the minority tax certificate. This policy was successfully supported by
the broadcast industry. Although it provided white owners an opportunity to
capitalize on minority progress, the policy was still a truly effective mechanism for
incorporating minorities into broadcast ownership. The policy provided minorities
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with bargaining power they would not have had otherwise. With some new
provision, such as caps on the amount of tax gains deferred and limits on the
number of times a certificate could be used, the policy can help bring new
owners into a rapidly consolidating industry while limiting the financial benefit to
existing majority owners.
In addition to the tax certificate, the FCC should institute a policy that
would reduce discrimination in advertising. As Ofori's study showed, bias and
racism towards black owned, black formatted stations still exists. 579 In 1986,
Congressional Representative Cardiss Hollins introduced a bill into the House of
Representatives that called for the denial of advertising expense deductions for
businesses that discriminated against minority owned or formatted stations in the
purchase or placement of advertising. 580 The regulation would have allowed an
aggrieved party the opportunity to bring civil actions to recover lost profits. Such
a policy would target the problem of discrimination by financially handicapping
businesses that discriminated. In addition, broadcasters would be able to recoup
monies lost based on advertising rates, market competition, and other related
factors.
There is a concern with such a policy about the ability (or inability) to
prove systemic advertising discrimination against a minority broadcaster. And
while one could argue about restraint of speech due to punitive nature of such a
policy, discrimination in any form is unlawful. If a minority broadcaster were able
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to document and prove a system of discrimination against his/her business, then
there would be cause to claim an injury or threat to the livelihood of their
business. And as noted in The Federal Trade Commission Act, "unfair methods
of competition in ... commerce ... and unfair practices in or affecting commerce ...
are herby declared unlawful." 581 If one was to ever dispute the notion that
discrimination in advertising exists or if the impacts of such discrimination are
real, then consider the following quote from radio salesperson Luis Alvarez taken
from Ofori's study:
"I recall being in front of a buyer and we were discussing
Ivory Soap and the buyer was telling me they were not
going to buy... they said "well, we have studies that show
Hispanics do not bathe as frequently as non-Hispanics."582

More importantly, such discrimination seems to be encouraged by the industry. A
national radio rep firm, Katz Media, sought to discourage media buys on minority
owned and/or minority formatted stations when it issued a company-wide memo
that stated,
"When it comes to delivering prospects not suspects the
urban [-formatted stations] deliver the largest amount of
listeners who turn out to be the least likely to purchase.
Median age is 23. Very young and very, very, poor
qualitative profile.583

These examples alone may or may not be considered direct evidence of
systematic discrimination. However, Ofori's study demonstrates there is good
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reason to believe minority owners would be able to gather substantial
evidence. 584
Lastly, the FCC can seek to dedicate frequency space in addition to what
already exists for minority broadcasters. Somewhere in between educational and
commercial radio, this frequency would provide women, minorities and other
marginalized groups an opportunity to present diverse programming to the public.
Though it is highly unlikely that any FCC proposal such as this would "pass
industry muster," perhaps the FCC's creation of low-power radio will serve a
similar purpose. The overall system of creating additional space on the
frequencies would serve several purposes. Minority owners would be removed
from competition with larger, group owned stations and could present
programming without the stress of competing against larger media
conglomerates. Additionally, creative and distinct programming that might be not
supported by the majority of the public would have an opportunity to be aired.
Industry Solutions

The industry can also help remedy the low participation of minorities
involved in broadcast ownership. As noted earlier, some major media companies
were eager to establish minority financing funds but only if the FCC further
relaxed restrictions on media/ market concentration. This is counter-productive to
what minority ownership seeks to do, which is to diversify the viewpoints in the
media. If their [minorities'] progress depends on the advancements of majority
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interest, the true rationale behind diversity of views is lost. By increasing
concentration of major media firms, they [majority media] would possibly have
greater access and concentration in markets where minority owners would want
to penetrate.
The broadcasting industry must make some commitments to diversifying
its products. One way that can be accomplished is by establishing an industry
wide fund from a portion of the gains deferred on tax certificates or other tax-free
sales. The portion can be a very small amount, such as one percent. The fund
would be open to minority groups for a one-time use in securing radio stations.
Another less precise solution would be to start an industry supported fund,
managed by the FCC, by taking a certain percentage of broadcasters profits. All
broadcasters would be required to give a portion of their profit, perhaps on a taxdeductible provision. The fund would be available to small businesses, women
and minorities to use as start-up monies in the communications industry.
In addition, broadcasters should seek to increase employment and
management opportunities for minorities. The usage of training and
developmental programs could be useful in recruiting minority talent into the
industry.
Judicial Solutions

The judiciary can also have a positive impact on the way minorities are
included in media ownership. First, the judiciary should reassess its position on
discrimination and affirmative action by returning to an intermediate level of
156

scrutiny. By reviewing race-based preferences with a lower level of scrutiny, the
courts can still maintain the intent of the Constitution. The government interest
would still have to be important and a substantial relationship would have to exist
between the government's classification and the purpose of the policy.
By returning to an intermediate level of review, race preferences can be
viewed in a historical context. As strict scrutiny makes any race preference highly
suspect, it also makes it hard for government agencies to address the needs of
its constituents. An intermediate level of judicial review would not undermine
agency authority and would provide then with opportunities to create policies and
legislation necessary to remedy discrimination in broadcasting, as well as other
segments of society.

FURTHER RESEARCH
There are many directions for further research as this topic crosses the
disciplines of communications, race studies, and law. Further research should
endeavor to use a multi-disciplinary approach, as the issues surrounding minority
ownership are not necessarily confined only to communications studies.
An analysis of FCC agency decisions on the various race based
preference policies would be most useful in future research. In addition, a
comparative analysis of congressional hearings and reports about minority
ownership would augment FCC decisions and provide the true intent and level of
evidence the judiciary now demands. In addition, continued use of critical race
theory to examine the role in communications and communications policy can
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provide a fresh look at marketplace forces in the industry and the impacts on
minority ownership.
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